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AVOIDING ANOTHER STEP IN A SERIES OF 
UNFORTUNATE LEGAL EVENTS: A 
CONSIDERATION OF BLACK LIFE UNDER 
AMERICAN LAW FROM 1619 TO 1972 AND A 
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OF LEGALLY BASED REPARATIONS 
Carlton Waterhouse*
Abstract: The growing body of literature on reparations consists primarily 
of articles showing that black reparations are consistent with various legal 
theories, promote racial justice, or further broader societal goals like 
eliminating poverty and promoting education. This article takes the dis-
tinct position of challenging reparations supporters to justify their 
conªdence in the legal system to deliver meaningful reparations for slav-
ery and segregation in light of the historic use of law as a means of instan-
tiating white racial supremacy and the prospective individualistic ap-
proach to race adopted by contemporary judges and legislators. The 
article also challenges those who oppose reparations based on its sup-
posed unfairness to contemporary citizens to explain how their position 
differs from that of past generations who opposed reparations and related 
legal efforts to redress racial injustices as unfair at that time. To support 
the challenge to reparations commentators, the article examines the his-
torical framework of blacks’ relationship to the law through legislation 
and court rulings from 1619–1963. The article closes by presenting an al-
ternative approach to reparations focused on building and strengthening 
black political, economic, and educational institutions. 
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If you stick a knife nine inches into my back and pull it out three inches, 
that is not progress. Even if you pull it all the way out, that is not progress. 
Progress is healing the wound, and America hasn’t even begun to pull out 
the knife. 
—El Hajj Malik El Shabazz (Malcolm X 1964) 
Introduction 
 In a series of children’s books and a recent feature ªlm, Lemony 
Snicket chronicles the lives of the Baudelaire orphans—three orphaned 
children from a wealthy family imperiled by a conspiring unscrupulous 
adversary, a neglectful guardian, and an otherwise dangerous world.1 
Following the demise of their parents, these children ªnd themselves 
subject to the schemes of uncaring adults seeking to gain their sizable 
fortune.2 Instead of rescuing them, the intervention of a neglectful 
banker responsible for providing them with a safe environment merely 
carries them from one set of unfortunate events to another.3 To sur-
vive, the children draw on their own unique abilities to stay alive and 
escape the plots launched against them.4 The title for this article ema-
nates from that story because it offers a helpful, albeit imperfect, meta-
phor for blacks’ experiences under law in America, from their arrival in 
1619 to the close of the second reconstruction in 1972 and beyond.5
 Rather than a crowning achievement of American democracy, the 
civil rights legislation of the 1960s and 1970s represented one more 
step in a series of unfortunate legal events that ultimately reºected 
the dominant attitude of society’s white majority toward ending the 
Jim Crow practices of the south.6 Despite their role in removing the 
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Lemony Snicket, A Series of Unfortunate Events (1999). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 I chose 1619 and 1972 based on the milestones in black experiences in America that 
these dates represent. 1619 marks the arrival of the ªrst blacks in the American colonies 
aboard a Dutch man-o-war. These men were traded into servitude following their arrival. 
See A. Leon Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal 
Process: the Colonial Period 20 (1978) (discussing the ªrst Africans’ enslavement in 
what would become America). Three centuries later, the United States Congress passed 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. This act represents the last of a series of civil rights laws 
passed from 1964 to 1972 to proscribe racial discrimination in America. See generally Roy L. 
Brooks et al., Civil Rights Litigation: Cases and Perspectives (1995). 
6 See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court 
and the Struggle for Racial Equality 5–6 (2004) (discussing the historic relationship 
between civil rights laws and broader society); Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Educa-
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imprimatur of legal legitimacy from much overt discrimination against 
blacks and others, these laws were merely a continuation in a series of 
unfortunate legal events.7 The courts’ subsequent rejection of 
afªrmative action as a remedy for historic racial bias, and the shifting 
legal standards applied in Equal Protection, Title VI, and Title VII 
civil rights cases, over the intervening thirty-three year period, reºect 
the most recent events in the unfortunate series.8 Like the Baudelaire 
orphans, blacks still have not found a guardian whom they can de-
pend on to protect them from those who would betray their rights. 
 This article contends that America’s laws and legal system consti-
tute a poor guardian for blacks against the “the tyranny of the major-
ity” because, in historic and contemporary analysis, they respond to 
and facilitate majoritarian racial bias in the executive, judicial, and 
legislative contexts.9 Rather than a general claim regarding all con-
temporary legal matters, this article asserts that legal issues explicitly 
regarding race such as afªrmative action, civil rights law, and repara-
tions reºect a majoritarian racial bias.10 In light of the foregoing, schol-
                                                                                                                      
tion and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 521 (1980) (considering the 
beneªt that civil rights laws provided to the United States’ predominant white majority). 
Civil rights legislation of the period was necessitated by the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
similar laws almost one hundred years earlier, during the Reconstruction Congress. See 
infra notes 78, 275–77 and accompanying text. The changed attitude of many white north-
erners, and some white southerners, about Jim Crow segregation precipitated the Civil 
Rights Era more than prescient legal argument. 
7 Employing the metaphor used by Malcolm X in the quote above, the civil rights laws 
of the 1960s and 1970s were not progress but the removal of the knife from black Amer-
ica’s back without healing the wounds caused by 344 years of lawful maltreatment. See 
infra Part I for a discussion of reparations as a systematic process undertaken to heal the 
wounds of slavery, segregation, and systematic subordination. 
8 Although this article does not address the past thirty years of civil rights law, others 
have sufªciently chronicled the Congressional and the Supreme Court’s retreat from the 
racially based civil rights positions and decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Kim-
berle’ Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1336–37 (1988); Alan D. Freeman, Legiti-
mizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court 
Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1051–52 (1978); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitu-
tion is Color-Blind,” 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1991). 
9 This article draws on blacks’ historical experience under law and the majoritarian 
limits of American democracy to deliver equal justice in formulating its critique of the 
legal systems ability to provide black reparations. See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy 
in America 248–52 (Heirloom ed., Arlington House 1966) (1835) (examining the majori-
tarian limits of American democracy); Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 Duke L.J. 
187, 278–86 (1997) (examining the Supreme Court’s role as a majoritarian institution in 
signiªcant cases involving the rights of blacks and other minorities). 
10 This corresponds to the “Restrictive View” of civil rights law. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 313–20. 
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ars and activists advocating legal based reparations for American slav-
ery and its legacy display what this article asserts is an unwarranted 
degree of conªdence in the American legal system. 
 Speciªcally, the article challenges those supporting legal based 
reparations to explain their reliance on the legal system to provide 
reparations despite the historic and contemporary legal subordination 
of blacks and other racial minorities when it corresponds with the per-
ceived interest of the majority. The article also challenges those oppos-
ing reparations, however, based on its supposed unfairness to America’s 
current citizens, to explain how their position differs from that of past 
generations of legal scholars and politicians who opposed reparations 
and related legal efforts to redress racial injustices. Failure by commen-
tators, on both sides, to address law’s historic role of protecting the in-
terest of the racial majority by subordinating blacks’ just legal claims 
presages a tenuous posture for legal reparations—a posture this article 
argues may encourage the development of yet another chapter in a se-
ries of unfortunate legal events.11
 Recent federal court decisions regarding the victims of the Tulsa, 
Oklahoma race riots and a suit by the descendants of enslaved blacks for 
reparations illustrate this point.12 In 1921, white rioters ravaged Green-
wood—Tulsa, Oklahoma’s African American neighborhood—indisc- 
riminately killing and injuring the community’s residents in the proc-
ess.13 In 2004, survivors of the riot and their descendants brought a 
                                                                                                                      
11 If we consider the fact that no United States Congress or federal court to date has 
been willing to provide reparations to black Americans for slavery, much less the general 
harms of Jim Crow segregation and related discrimination, despite recurring arguments 
and requests to do so, then conªdence that legislation or judicial cases will provide an 
acceptable award or provision of reparations seems unwarranted. See When Sorry Isn’t 
Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice 
309–14 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999). See generally Should America Pay?: Slavery and the 
Raging Debate on Reparations (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003). This conªdence can 
be distinguished from the conªdence in the legal system displayed by Thurgood Marshall 
and others in their campaign to end Jim Crow segregation. Marshall and others predicated 
their assault on Jim Crow laws upon a northern precedent of integrated educational facili-
ties and southern states’ failure to provide equal services, facilities, etc. that the Court’s 
argument in Plessy v. Ferguson required. See Klarman, supra note 6, at 290–320. 
12 See Alexander v. Oklahoma (Alexander II ), 382 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004); Af-
rican-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp 2d 721, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
13 “The riot destroyed an estimated 1,256 homes along with churches, schools, busi-
nesses, even a hospital and library in the African-American community of Greenwood. 
Between 100 and 300 people were killed.” Alexander v. Oklahoma (Alexander I ), No. 03-C-
133-E, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *1 (D. Okla. Mar. 19, 2004). In Alexander II, the fed-
eral district court offered the following description of the riots in its opinion: 
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claim against the city and state for damages associated with the riot.14 
In afªrming the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Oklahoma granting a summary judgment motion 
for the defendants, Chief Circuit Judge Deanell Reece Tacha wrote, 
“[t]he Tulsa Race Riot represents a tragic chapter in our collective his-
tory. While we have found no legal avenue exists through which Plain-
tiffs can bring their claims, we take no great comfort in that conclu-
sion.”15
 A recent decision of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois provides another example of the way courts 
view reparations based suits. After considering the claims brought by 
the descendants of enslaved Africans against corporations who sup-
ported enslavement and its legacy, the Court rendered a decision grant-
ing defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss.16 In that case, plaintiffs’ 
claims against the corporations included conspiracy, conversion, and 
unjust enrichment for their role in the institution of slavery and its leg-
acy in the Untied States.17 After considering the allegations, the court 
offered the following conclusion: 
It is beyond debate that slavery has caused tremendous suf-
fering and ineliminable scars throughout our Nation’s his-
tory. No reasonable person can fail to recognize the malig-
nant impact, in body and spirit, on the millions of human 
beings held as slaves in the United States. Neither can any 
reasonable person, however, fail to appreciate the massive, 
comprehensive, and dedicated undertaking of the free to 
liberate the enslaved and preserve the Union. Millions 
fought in our Civil War. Approximately six hundred and 
twenty thousand died . . . . The impact of this struggle on the 
                                                                                                                      
Armed with machine guns, the white mob ravaged Greenwood, scattering 
machine gun ªre indiscriminately at its African-American residents. During 
the night, the Governor called in the Oklahoma National Guard to restore 
order. The guardsmen, often acting in conjunction with the white mob, dis-
armed the African-American men who were defending their community and 
placed them in “protective custody.” Thus purged of any resistance, the white 
mob burned virtually every building in Greenwood. By 11:00 a.m. on the 
morning of June 1, 1921, when the Riot ended, forty-two square blocks of the 
Greenwood community lay in ashes. 
382 F.3d at 1212. 
14 Alexander I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *1. 
15 Alexander II, 382 F.3d at 1220. 
16 African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 375 F. Supp 2d at 743–44. 
17 Id. at 721. 
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families of the wounded and the dead was immeasurable and 
lasting. The victorious and the vanquished together shared 
the cup of suffering . . . . The impact of this struggle on the 
Union as a whole was also signiªcant. The enslavers in the 
United States who resisted or failed to end human chattel 
slavery sustained great personal and economic loss during 
and following the four years of the War. Generations of 
Americans were burdened with paying the social, political, 
and ªnancial costs of this horriªc War.18
These two cases and the judges’ opinions reºect a view that each set 
of circumstances represented unfortunate events in American history, 
but not ones that the law could address. While the opinion in the 
Tulsa case seems much more sympathetic to the unique suffering of 
the Plaintiffs and their descendants, the result and effect of the deci-
sion offers no more to the victims of the Tulsa riot than that provided 
by the reparations case to the slave descendants. These opinions re-
ºect the judicial attitude that black reparations advocates can almost 
certainly expect to encounter from the American judiciary when seek-
ing redress for America’s past racial injustices.19
 Neither the American judiciary nor its legislatures has provided 
blacks with a consistent level of protection against, or remediation of, 
racial injustice.20 In America, race law is never settled; it remains, in-
stead, in constant ºux dependant on the prevailing attitude of the 
majority.21 This article contends that basing reparations on such an 
unstable and undependable legal system will likely produce undesir-
able and unsatisfactory results. 
 The article is divided into ªve parts. Part I considers some in-
sights from moral philosophy to better explicate the goal of repara-
tions. In using this approach, the article seeks to extend the discus-
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. at 780. 
19 A legal regime fashioned by the United States Congress to provide reparations like-
wise offers little likelihood of an adequate reparations scheme but would be even more 
subject to the whims of the majority that over time have proved disappointing for black 
Americans. See infra Part I. 
20 See infra Part II (examining laws relating to blacks in particular from 1619 to 1963); 
see also supra note 8 (considering the dynamic nature of the last forty years of civil rights 
laws). 
21 See generally Ediberto Román, Citizenship and the Dialectic of Membership and 
Exclusion (Mar. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with author) for a broader 
discussion of the ºuctuating status of racial minorities in the United States and its territo-
ries as well as a consideration of the racial component of domestic laws rooted in the war 
on terror. 
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sion beyond the conªnes of traditional legal argument to deepen the 
consideration of reparations’ proper goal. This part then concludes 
by introducing arguments contesting the American legal system’s abil-
ity to meet reparations’ proffered goal. Part II discusses the founda-
tions of the “Reign of Terror.” Part III presents a survey of laws gov-
erning black life from 1619 to 1972. The survey examines federal, 
state, and colonial laws used to restrain blacks’ educational, political, 
and economic rights and opportunities from their initial arrival to the 
civil rights era. The part also includes a brief consideration of civil 
rights laws passed from 1963 to 1972 and their efªcacy for repairing 
the harms caused to black communities and individuals by the previ-
ous legal regime. Part IV assesses the proªciency of American laws to 
provide racial justice to blacks in light of Derrick Bell’s theory of ra-
cial realism, Kimberle’ Crenshaw’s understanding of restrictive and 
expansive civil rights jurisprudence, and the political insights of Ralph 
Bunche. Drawing on the work of each of these ªgures, this part ex-
plores the future prospects of the American legal system to protect 
blacks from the excesses of America’s non-black majority. In light of 
the insights gained from the analysis in Part IV, Part V looks to the 
work of Gary Peller in examining the theoretical roots of America’s 
historical discourse about race-consciousness and its rejection as an 
approach to racial issues. Extending Peller’s analysis, the part ex-
plores why race-consciousness constitutes an essential ingredient in 
pursuing the goals of a black reparations program.22 Finally, the con-
clusion highlights some speciªc proposals for a black reparations 
program designed to remedy the educational, political, and economic 
harms visited upon black communities. 
I. Reparations’ Goals and Law’s Insufªciency 
 Commentators tend to agree that the goal of black reparations is 
to repair something, despite considerable disagreement over what 
should be repaired and how.23 This section considers the law’s ability 
to make such repairs by brieºy exploring the nature of the harms 
caused by slavery, the nature of the reparations needed to redress the 
harms, and the desirable goals of a reparations program. To guide the 
                                                                                                                      
22 This article only introduces the author’s approach to the subject. See Carlton Water-
house, The Full Price of Freedom: African American Responsibility to Repair the Harms of 
Slavery and Segregation (Apr. 3, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) 
(on ªle with author) for an institution-based model of reparations. 
23 See infra notes 33, 34. 
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investigation, two concepts developed by moral philosopher Timothy 
Jackson relevant to reparations are explored, along with arguments 
made by abolitionists Benjamin Franklin and Wendell Phillips in an-
tebellum America. 
 Jackson develops two concepts of moral philosophy that are rele-
vant to black reparations: abomination and liberation.24 He considers 
abomination from an anthropological perspective, supported by three 
dimensions of moral analysis: aretology, deontology, and teleology.25 
Using these three perspectives, Jackson gleans a fuller sense of abomi-
nation. He writes: 
It is possible to interpret the “inhumanity” of abominations 
in terms of debilitating consequences . . . but when seen de-
ontologically, being abominable is not the effect of improper 
actions but their cause, not an atavistic breakdown after im-
morality but a violation of the moral law. In fact, a deonto-
logical abomination is most distinctively a conscious rejec-
tion of the moral law itself and with it practical standards for 
human conduct. Finally, when seen aretologically the abomi-
nable is a mode of existence that is so intrinsically vicious as 
to undermine the normativity of any state of character. As 
extraordinary vice or brutality, the abominable subverts the 
very idea of personal integrity.26
Further, he maintains that certain limits precede and constrain any 
choices that are sensitive to the demands intrinsic to living with other 
people. In Jackson’s view, “an abomination might be deªned as what 
radically undercuts or transgresses those bounds (material and cul-
tural) that have made and continue to make an ordered human exis-
tence possible.”27
 By these standards, the American system of chattel slavery was 
certainly an abomination. The system reduced enslaved Africans to a 
raw commodity without personhood.28 All notions of human dignity 
were denied to the Africans in their transport and in their indoctrina-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Timothy Jackson, Love Disconsoled: Meditations on Christian Charity 
94 (1999). 
25 These dimensions of moral analysis, thought to originate in Greek philosophy, serve 
as fundamental axes underlying both contemporary and historic approaches to moral 
philosophy. Id. at 98. Aretology treats the character of moral actors; deontology focuses on 
the form of actions; and teleology addresses the consequences of actions. Id. at 98–99. 
26 Id. at 99–100. 
27 Id. at 94. 
28 The Classic Slave Narratives 34 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1987). 
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tion to their new lives. In deªning slavery in America, abolitionist 
David Barrow wrote: 
When I use the word ‘slave’ or ‘slaves’, I would be understood 
to mean such beings of the human race who are (without any 
crime committed by them, more than is common to all men) 
with their offspring to perpetual generations, considered le-
gal property; compelled by superior force, unconditionally to obey 
the commands of their owners, to be bought and sold, to be 
given and received, to go and come, to marry or forbear, to be 
separated when married at pleasure, to eat, drink, sleep, wear, la-
bor, and to be beaten at their owner’s discretion . . . .29
The denial of human dignity, in fact, was one of the principle deªning 
characteristics of the American system of slavery. Abolitionist author 
William Goodell explained how legal treatises of his day deªned “own-
ership” of the enslaved.30 He wrote, “[i]t is plain that the dominion of 
the master is as unlimited as that which is tolerated by the laws of any 
civilized country in relation to brute animals—to quadrupeds, to use the 
words of the civil law.”31 Enslaved African women suffered special vic-
timization caused by rape and forced sexual service as breeders of new 
property for the slave master.32 This system of slavery constituted a total 
effacement of human dignity. 
 Abomination’s polar opposite—liberation or freedom—represents 
the other side of Jackson’s model and the focus of my analysis.33 In his 
discussion, he elaborates on two distinct understandings of freedom. 
Liberum arbitrium, he notes, represents “freedom of choice” while libertas 
signiªes a “more holistic notion of good disposition, candor, and per-
sonal integrity.”34 He elaborates: 
                                                                                                                      
29 Dwight Dumond, Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America 7 (1961) 
(citing David Barrow, Involuntary, Unmerited, Perpetual, Absolute, Heriditary 
Slavery, Examined; On the Principles of Nature, Reason, Justice, Policy, and Scrip-
ture, at vi (1808)). 
30 See William Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice: Its 
Distinctive Features Shown by Its Statutes, Judicial Decisions, and Illustrative 
Facts 27 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1853) (discussing the law governing the enslaved as 
well as “free” blacks). 
31 Id. 
32 Dorothy Schneider & Carl Schneider, Slavery in America: From Colonial 
Times to the Civil War 87–89 (2000). 
33 Jackson, supra note 24, at 106. 
34 Id. at 105. 
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External, telic liberation is from something rather than for 
something. Such liberation is often a very great good, crucial 
for autonomous individuals as well as for democratic polities, 
but it clearly does not exhaust the meaning of the word and is 
not the most positive sense of liberty . . . . For if the end of 
oppression and the offer of aid [to those liberated] do not 
fundamentally empower . . . [them] to care for and about 
themselves . . . then it is at best incomplete and at worst pa-
ternalistic.35
In simple terms, liberum arbitrium suggests negative freedom—freedom 
from some external limiting force. Libertas, in contrast, connotes a posi-
tive freedom—freedom for human ºourishing. In antebellum America, 
many opposing slavery embraced the liberation of enslaved blacks with 
the limited sense of liberum arbitrium. While thoroughly committed to 
emancipation, supporters of the colonization of enslaved blacks, like 
President Abraham Lincoln and Robert G. Harper, nonetheless lacked 
a commitment to enabling the newly freed to promote their full hu-
manity by improving their moral, intellectual, and political condition.36 
General emancipation schemes, like speciªc acts of manumission that 
merely freed the enslaved with no support or aid, also represent liberum 
arbitrium by virtue of their failure to recognize and attend to the harms 
caused by a lifetime of bondage, or to take the steps necessary to enable 
the newly freed persons to ºourish. Jackson points out the inadequacy 
of negative liberty alone, noting the necessity of positive conceptions of 
human well-being related to the development of human potential.37 
Only the writings of radical abolitionists envision emancipation consis-
tent with libertas and the positive promotion of human ºourishing.38
 Although in the minority, Benjamin Franklin and Wendell Phil-
lips offered two robust views of emancipation consistent with the no-
tion of libertas. Benjamin Franklin, a former slave master who manu-
mitted those he enslaved and joined the ranks of abolitionists, made 
the following remarks in a 1790 public address on the abolition of 
slavery: 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. at 106. 
36 Dumond, supra note 29, at 130. Robert G. Harper was one of the founders of the 
American Colonization Society. 
37 Jackson, supra note 24, at 106. 
38 See Dumond, supra note 29, at 16–25 (examining the varying views of emancipation 
held in antebellum America). 
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To instruct, to advise, to qualify those who have been restored 
to freedom, for the exercise and enjoyment of civil liberty; to 
promote in them habits of industry; to furnish them with em-
ployments suited to their age, sex, talents, and other circum-
stances; and to procure their children an education calculated 
for their future situation in life,—these are the great outlines 
of our annexed plan, which we have adopted, and which we 
conceive will essentially promote the public good, and the 
happiness of these our hitherto too much neglected fellow 
citizens.39
Franklin’s remarks demonstrate a response to slavery that approaches 
the full liberation associated with libertas. His call for attention to the 
needs of the emancipated shows a motivation consistent with a fuller 
notion of liberation. Franklin’s words display his intention to enable 
blacks to fully exercise and enjoy civil liberty.40 He speaks directly to 
the educational, economic, and political development of the emanci-
pated as a matter of obligation.41 Jackson posits that “the most robust 
sense of ‘liberation’ involves internal empowerment, a revolution in 
the self rather than in the circumstances, a fundamental heightening 
of the capacity for personal care.”42 Franklin’s remarks point to the 
personal development of the emancipated as a vital aspect of their lib-
eration. He recognized that such development required nothing less 
than a personal investment from those promoting abolition.43
 Unfortunately, by the 1870s many abolitionists lost sight of the 
robust liberation envisioned by Franklin and limited their agitation to 
the provision of negative freedoms (i.e., civil liberties) for blacks.44 In 
a speech at the Republican Convention, Fredrick Douglas com-
                                                                                                                      
39 Id. at 127. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Jackson, supra note 24, at 106. This internal revolution identiªed by Jackson does 
not exist in isolation but depends upon certain freedom from external constraints associ-
ated with liberum arbitrium. 
43 Dumond, supra note 29, at 127. 
44 The efforts of the Freedman’s Bureau and some missionary associations serve as the 
exception to the limited view of liberation embraced at the time. These organizations ac-
tively engaged in providing education and training for the newly emancipated. Although 
educational efforts continued in the spirit of full liberation, alone they were insufªcient to 
meet the needs of the newly freed blacks as they failed to address the multitude of eco-
nomic and other needs these blacks faced. Moreover, of the four million blacks living in 
the south, the bureau could only provide education to seventy-ªve thousand women, men, 
and children from 1865–1868—a remarkable achievement nonetheless. W.E.B. DuBois, 
Black Reconstruction in America 1860—1880, at 648–67 (Free Press 1962). 
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mented, “[y]ou turned us loose to the sky, to the storm, to the whirl-
wind, and, worst of all, you turned us loose to the wrath of our infuri-
ated masters.”45 In the agricultural based society of the South, land 
was essential to meet the physical needs of individual families and en-
tire communities. The principal skills of newly emancipated blacks 
rested ªrmly in agriculture.46 The provision of land, originally en-
dorsed by abolitionists, along with education and the right to vote, 
was the single aspect of the abolitionist plan that addressed blacks’ 
daily needs for survival.47 The failure to make land available con-
signed “freedpeople” to dependency on their former enslavers.48 This 
dependency stiºed rather than fostered full liberation for blacks be-
cause it prevented them from providing basic care for themselves and 
others. The former enslavers routinely abused the relationships that 
developed with the freedman and other blacks by denying them the 
ability to buy land and by cheating them out of promised income. The 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as well as the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875 came in the breach.49 Unfortu-
nately, these legal mechanisms offered blacks the hope of civil liber-
ties without the means to enjoy them fully, as understood decades ear-
lier by Benjamin Franklin in 1790.50
 By the 1870s some abolitionists endorsed the idea that blacks 
needed to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps rather than receive 
additional assistance.51 Wendell Phillips served as one of a few excep-
tions to the trend. He actively lobbied Congress to create a department 
to oversee land distribution, loans, and other services for the emanci-
pated.52 In response to the bootstrap argument, Phillips wrote: 
This adult man, a husband and father, we have robbed him 
of wages for forty years. The ‘root, hog or die’ advice, to such 
a victim is the coollest [sic] impertinence . . . . Every Negro 
                                                                                                                      
45 John David Smith, Black Voices from Reconstruction: 1865–1877, at 147 (1996). 
46 See Booker T. Washington, Up From Slavery 127 (Penguin Putnam 1986) (1901) 
(discussing emancipated blacks’ skills and opportunities to make a living following the War). 
47 James McPherson, The Abolitionist Legacy: From Reconstruction to the 
NAACP 71–75 (1976). 
48 Smith, supra note 45, at 147. 
49 See Philip Rubio, A History of Afªrmative Action: 1619–2000, at 34–35 (2001) 
(providing an in depth consideration of the Reconstruction Amendments and the federal 
civil rights legislation that accompanied them); see also Roy L. Brooks, Atonement and 
Forgiveness: A New Model for Black Reparations 223 (2004). 
50 See supra text accompanying notes 39–43. 
51 See McPherson, supra note 47, at 79. 
52 Id. at 78. 
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family can justly claim forty acres of land, one year’s support, 
a furnished cottage, a mule and farm tools, and free schools 
for life.53
Phillips’ comments offered a model of full liberation that robustly ad-
dressed the needs of those who suffered the abomination of slavery. 
Franklin and Phillips present understandings of liberation consistent 
with Jackson’s conception of libertas. Their goal was to provide the 
emancipated with the educational, political, and economic resources 
necessary to enable them to exercise and enjoy their full humanity. 
 Unfortunately, American society not only rejected the vision of 
liberation offered by Franklin and Phillips, but returned to its prac-
tices of peonage, abuse, and the legal subordination of blacks.54 The 
nation adopted the legal subordination of blacks as the prevailing re-
sponse to the former centuries of enslavement.55 This widely em-
braced system of legal subordination inºicted fresh injuries upon new 
generations of blacks for the next one hundred years, and placed the 
descendants of the enslaved and emancipated blacks in need of edu-
cational, political, and economic provisions that would enable them 
to fully exercise and enjoy their humanity.56
 As established by Boris Bittker in The Case for Black Reparations and 
James Forman in The Black Manifesto, blacks need and have sought 
reparations for the harms America inºicted upon them beyond the 
civil rights legislation passed from 1964 to 1972.57 The Black Manifesto 
does not differentiate the acts warranting reparations, stating simply, 
“[f]or centuries we have been forced to live as colonized people inside 
the United States, victimized by the most vicious racist system in the 
world. We have helped to build the most industrial country in the 
world.”58 It makes clear, nonetheless, that the legal claim for repara-
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. Elsewhere Phillips writes, “[l]and should have been divided among the negroes, 
forty acres to each family, and tools—poor pay for the unpaid toil of six generations on that 
very soil. Mere emancipation without any compensation to the victim was pitiful atonement 
for ages of wrong.” Wendell Phillips, Views of an Old Abolitionist, 128 N. Am. Rev. 258, 260 
(1879), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/ncps:@ªeld(docid+ 
@lit(abq7578-0128-27)). 
54 See infra Part III.A–B. 
55 See infra Part II.C. 
56 A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. 77 ( James Washington ed., 1990). 
57 See Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations 8–29 (2003); Arnold Schu-
chter, Reparations: The Black Manifesto and Its Challenge to White America, at 
ix–xx (1970); James Forman, Black Manifesto (1969), reprinted in Bittker, supra at 167. 
58 Forman, supra note 57, at 167. 
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tions began centuries earlier and continues to the present. The Na-
tional Black Political Convention likewise made a demand for repara-
tions in 1972, rooted in “historic enslavement” and the “racist discrimi-
nation” inºicted upon blacks following the Civil War.59 Bittker, in 
contrast, makes the case that the long years of segregation and subor-
dination from the civil war to the civil rights movement alone warrants 
reparations for blacks.60 In each example, the case is nonetheless clear 
that one hundred years after emancipation, blacks still sought the full 
liberation envisioned by Franklin and Phillips. 
 Today, despite the thirty year passage of time since the civil rights 
movement, the warrant and the need for reparations continue.61 This 
article contends that the goal of reparations today correlates with the 
vision articulated by abolitionists like Franklin and Phillips. Repara-
tions also correlate to Jackson’s concept of libertas: providing blacks 
with the educational, political, and economic resources necessary to 
enable them to fully exercise and enjoy their civil liberties. 
 The issue of reparations for slavery in America continues to gar-
ner increasing attention in both academic and popular literature.62 In 
the legal scholarship, a growing number of scholars and articles have 
contributed to the discourse around the issue by exploring the justice 
claims and the legal basis for reparations as well as the societal and 
psychological basis for reparations.63 Despite signiªcant contributions 
                                                                                                                      
59 Bittker, supra note 57, at 79. The convention sought reparations in unspeciªed 
land, capital, and cash while the Manifesto sought speciªc endowments for the develop-
ment of educational, economic, and ªnancial institutions. 
60 Id. at 12–26. 
61 Blacks have collectively and individually improved their educational and economic 
standing since emancipation. Nonetheless, considerable wounds from enslavement and a 
century of segregation and subordination linger in black communities and families. See 
generally Joe R. Feagin, Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Repa-
rations (2000). 
62 Since 1998, more than thirty articles have been published on the subject, and four 
symposia have been held at the following schools: Boston University, Harvard University, 
Boston College, and New York University. See, e.g., Symposium, Healing the Wounds of Slav-
ery: Can Present Legal Remedies Cure Past Wrongs?, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 1 (2004); Sym-
posium, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1135 (2004); see also infra 
notes 59, 60, 85. 
63 See generally Roy Brooks, Toward A Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave Redress, 6 Afr.-Am. 
L. & Pol’y Rep. 49 (2004); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Repara-
tions for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 497 (2003); Rhonda Magee, The Master’s Tools, 
From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Out-
sider Remedies Discourse, 79 Va. L. Rev. 863 (1993); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: 
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Charles J. 
Ogletree, Chapter 17 Addressing the Racial Divide: Reparations, 20 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 
115 (2004); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Reparations: Accommodating Wrongs or Honoring Resis-
 
2006] A Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations 221 
from a wide range of scholars over the last twenty years, this article 
addresses a remaining deªciency in the literature and the discourse 
more broadly regarding the American legal system’s ability to provide 
meaningful reparations to blacks for the harms of slavery and segre-
gation.64 In consideration of the issue, however, this article serves as 
one part of a larger normative project investigating reparations for 
slavery, segregation, and legal subordination.65
 Despite the legitimate justiªcation and the genuine need, the 
American legal system seems unable to accommodate the demand for 
reparations. The law’s weakness in this regard results from two distinct 
causes. The ªrst cause is fundamental and its full exploration rests 
beyond the scope of this article. It derives from the necessity that 
blacks must control and direct the reparative process that is required 
to redress the diverse harms outstanding from centuries of maltreat-
ment.66 This perspective contends that blacks play the primary role in 
orchestrating the repair of their communities and families rather than 
judges or legislators.67 While this approach does not exclude legisla-
tive or judicial action as a vehicle to achieve some reparative ends, it 
does break with the notion that by presenting the “right case” blacks 
can “win” reparations or legislators can award reparations. Thus, this 
proposal differs with reparations models that place blacks in a passive 
role with reparations as something that the American judiciary or leg-
                                                                                                                      
tance?, 1 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 27 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: 
Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 477 
(1998). 
64 See generally Art Alcausin Hall, There Is a Lot to Be Repaired Before We Get to Reparations: 
A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race That Impact the Fate of African American Reparations, 2 
Scholar 1 (2000); Donald Aquinas Lancaster, Jr., The Alchemy and Legacy of the United States 
of America’s Sanction of Slavery and Segregation: A Property Law and Equitable Remedy Analysis of 
African American Reparations, 43 How. L.J. 171 (2000); Jeremy Levitt, Black African Repara-
tions: Making a Claim for Enslavement and Systematic De Jure Segregation and Racial Discrimina-
tion Under American and International Law, 25 S.U. L. Rev. 1 (1997); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 689 
(2003); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Ameri-
cans, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 597 (1993); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider 
the Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 429 (1998). The aforementioned 
authors along with a host of others have greatly advanced the dialogue on the subject. 
65 As a legal scholar trained as a social ethicist, it appears to me that many of the arti-
cles on this subject are arguments based in an implicit normative social theory addressing 
three hallmark axes of ethics: deontology, aretology, and consequentialism. While this 
article does not address the signiªcance of the normative theory and claims underlying 
the existing literature, the analysis of the issue ºows from an intentional application of 
normative social theory to the question. See generally Waterhouse, supra note 22. 
66 See infra text accompanying notes 364–65. 
67 See infra text accompanying notes 364–65. 
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islature will provide.68 Efforts to redress past harms can actually be 
counter-productive, cruel, or insulting69 when they are not accompa-
nied by actions that attend to both the needs and agency of the in-
jured group.70
 Blacks will have to play a primary role in the creation, develop-
ment, and implementation of a system that cements the sustained 
availability and use of economic, political, and cultural resources neces-
sary to fully exercise and enjoy their civil liberties.71 Entrusting respon-
sibility for the creation of such a program to judges or legislators for 
legal instantiation seems unwise. Numerous examples of failed, inade-
quate, and demeaning redress and reparations programs inform this 
position. The U.S. treatment of Native American reparations claims 
under the Indian Claims Commission Act, Japan’s handling of repara-
tions for Korean comfort women during War World II, and German 
reparations for the gypsy victims of the Nazi regime all provide exam-
ples of how government-based reparations programs often frustrate, 
rather than fulªll, efforts to redress the wounds of past injustice.72
 Blacks’ experiences with law over 344 years of American history 
also demonstrate that the American legal system lacks the capacity to 
provide reparations.73 Rather than a means of securing or providing 
                                                                                                                      
68 The popular model for reparations often places past victims in the single role as 
claimant. To achieve the goal of reparations articulated above, however, blacks today will 
have to construct a reparative model that addresses the individual and communal harms 
inºicted. Simple claim based systems lack that capacity. Like an injured person recovering 
from trauma, blacks must play an active role in their own recovery. The passive receipt of 
money without a plan for regaining lost or impeded abilities would fall short of true repa-
ration. 
69 Redress or reparations provided to the several tribes of North America have often 
been inadequate and even offensive. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, and 
Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1994) (assess-
ing past redress for Native Americans). 
70 Agency, here, refers to the active role or instrumentality of the group or its members 
in the reparative process. In contrast with the legal notion of agency that focuses on ac-
tions undertaken on another’s behalf, agency in this sense necessarily includes actions 
carried out on one’s own behalf. 
71 Despite the advancements experienced by blacks from the 1940s to the 1970s and to 
a lesser extent from the 1970s to the present, blacks individually and collectively experi-
ence the cost of past discrimination in their political, educational, and economic re-
sources. See Feagin, supra note 61, at 24–27, 186–90. That cost ranges from the vast dispari-
ties in wealth between blacks and whites at comparable income levels to the dearth of 
blacks with doctoral degrees and the absence of blacks in statewide elected ofªces. See id. 
Black overrepresentation in unemployment, high school drop-out rates, infant mortality, 
incarceration, and poverty likewise reºect America’s discriminatory past. See id. 
72 See When Sorry Isn’t Enough, supra note 11, at 8–11 (examining national and in-
ternational reparations and their limitations). 
73 See infra Part III. 
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justice, the American legal system served as a primary element in the 
enslavement, segregation, and forced subordination of blacks through 
most of American history.74 This historic phenomenon did not derive 
from jurisprudential necessity, but resulted instead from the racialized 
nature of the legal system as means of securing majoritarian prefer-
ences. Derrick Bell’s theory of racial realism, the political insights of 
Ralph Bunche, and blacks’ experiences under law from 1619 to 1972 
guide this analysis and support this position.75
 Today, the legal system continues to reºect the preferences of the 
society’s white majority.76 Both judges and legislators act with full 
awareness that the successful implementation of their decisions and 
enactments require the majority’s support.77 Notwithstanding Brown v. 
Board of Education’s success as the death knell of de jure segregation, 
the Supreme Court’s early and continued failure to achieve integrated 
education ºowed directly from the white majority’s refusal to support 
the decision.78 Accordingly, any legally-based program for reparations 
will require the support of America’s white majority; however, no such 
support is likely to be forthcoming for a reparative program that 
meets the goals articulated above.79 The idea of beneªting blacks in a 
way that offers no apparent beneªt to whites has never enjoyed popu-
lar support in America.80 The Reconstruction Congress came closest 
to this goal in drafting legislation for creating the Freedman’s Bureau 
as an agency to assist emancipated blacks.81 The Congress ultimately 
rejected that legislation, however, on the basis that it improperly fa-
vored blacks and adopted legislation that attended to the needs of 
                                                                                                                      
74 See infra Part III. 
75 See Black Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century 183–202 (August Meier 
et al. eds., 1971) [hereinafter Black Protest Thought]; see also Derrick Bell, Racism Is 
Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79, 79 (1991). 
76 This underscores the implicit danger democracy poses to minority groups. For a dis-
cussion of the relationship between minority rights and the perceived interest of the white 
majority, see Bell, supra note 6, at 530. 
77 See Klarman, supra note 6, at 5–7 (discussing judicial decisions’ relationship to 
broader societal views); see also Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, at 196–202. Legis-
lators are of course charged with representing their constituents and ignore such views at 
their own political peril. 
78 Klarman, supra note 6, at 398–421; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 
483, 495–96 (1954). Consider the massive resistance to Brown and its progeny. 
79 See Robert A. Sedler, Claims for Reparations for Racism Undermine the Struggle for Equal-
ity, 3 J.L. Soc’y 119, 119–24 (2002) (discussing the limited circumstances under which 
whites support race-based programs to aide blacks and their sure rejection of reparations 
claims today). 
80 See id. 
81 See Rubio, supra note 49, at 46–49. 
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white refugees as well.82 As polling on the question of reparations 
shows, whites today are still not interested in providing beneªts exclu-
sively to blacks because of the perceived unfair racial advantage it 
provides.83 Accordingly, reparations advocates who share the repara-
tions goal adopted by this article need to explain their conªdence 
that the American judiciary or the United States Congress can con-
struct a viable reparations program.84
 Rather than warning against the likely shortcomings of a legally 
based reparations program, most of the existing scholarship argues the 
merits of reparations as a matter of law or social philosophy.85 Scholar-
ship supporting reparations for blacks in America turns on three main 
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. (discussing contemporary court protection over the “rights of whites”); see also 
Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1515, 1517 
(1990).
83 See Sedler, supra note 79, at 120–24. On the question of reparations, polls indicate 
that eighty percent of whites oppose reparations of any sort while blacks support the gov-
ernment payment of reparations at around the sixty-seven percent level. Courtland Milloy, 
Cash Alone Can Never Right Slavery’s Wrongs, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 2002, at C01. Consider 
also society’s rejection of afªrmative action as a remedial program for generalizable past 
discrimination on the basis that it provides an unfair advantage to blacks and others. Ru-
bio, supra note 49, at 164–65. 
84 Commentators pursuing reparations as a means to attain racial reconciliation or 
improved social welfare programs may still hold conªdence in the law’s ability to achieve 
such ends. This article contends, however, that neither of these meets a fundamental re-
quirement that reparations repair some substantive harm inºicted upon blacks. Repara-
tion has two primary meanings in its derivation from late Middle English and its common 
origin with repair from the Latin reparare. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 2533 
(5th ed. 2002). The ªrst meaning is restoration or renewal, and the second is making 
amends or providing compensation for a wrong committed. Id. The concept represented 
by the second set of meanings–to make amends–of both repair and reparations exem-
pliªes the dominant and popular notion of reparations in discourse and the literature. It 
also rests at the heart of the ambiguity of the proper goal of reparations. This article main-
tains that goals of reparations rooted in broader social policy objectives, rather than reme-
diation, run the risk of using the past suffering of blacks as a means to an end. These ap-
proaches advance laudable goals for American society, but these are not reparations for 
slavery and segregation as much as broader social policy objectives rooted in a normative 
social theory of substantive equality. Clearly, most of these goals would be viable for Ameri-
can society even if the trans-Atlantic slave trade or Jim Crow segregation had never oc-
curred. 
85 Even though the position adopted in this article questions the level of conªdence 
that many commentators have in the legal system to provide and sustain meaningful repa-
rations, it endorses the substantial development of arguments by commentators establish-
ing the legal and moral warrants for reparations. Those bringing reparations claims and 
promoting reparations legislation have, likewise, made a vital contribution to this impor-
tant subject. See generally Troy Duster, Repairing the National Memory by Acknowledging the 
Living Presence of ‘Our Childhood Locked in the Closet’, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 43 (2004) 
(examining attendant beneªts of bringing reparations claims); Emma Coleman Jordan, 
The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 21 (2004). 
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axes: perspective, methodology, and goals.86 Perspective describes the 
approach endorsed as either prospective or retrospective. Methodology 
represents the means preferred as either adjudicatory or legislative/pol- 
itical. Goals articulate the principal end sought as social conciliation, 
victim remediation, or societal transformation.87 Most of the legal lit-
erature on black reparations classiªes as prospective, adjudicatory, and 
remedial/transformative.88 These articles seek to show that black repa-
rations are consistent with various causes of action or legal theories, 
would promote racial justice, and/or further broader societal goals 
such as eliminating poverty, decreasing unfair incarceration, and pro-
moting education.89 Another segment of the literature can be classiªed 
as prospective, legislative, and conciliatory. These writings conceptual-
ize reparations as a meaningful step toward healing deep racial wounds 
caused by slavery and its legacy.90 The bulk of the remaining literature 
is an assortment of reºections based on comparative and international 
                                                                                                                      
86 A much smaller segment of literature rejects a traditional notion of reparations for 
African Americans. Most of it does so based on one or more of the following: the absence 
of victims and perpetrators, the need to move forward on racial issues, lack of political 
support, and the dictates of judicial economy. See generally Duster, supra note 85; Ryan Fort-
son, Correcting the Harms of Slavery: Collective Liability, the Limited Prospects of Success for a Class 
Action Suit for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White Racial Identity, 6 Afr.-
Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 71 (2004); Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to 
African-Americans, 29 S.U. L. Rev. 25 (2001); Jordan, supra note 85; Van B. Luong, Political 
Interest Convergence: African American Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 U. 
Haw. L. Rev. 253 (2002); Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the 
Slavery Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 615 (2003); Randall Robinson, 
What America Owes to Blacks and What Blacks Owe to Each Other, 6 Afr.-Am. L. & Pol’y Rep. 1 
(2004). 
87 See Brophy, supra note 63, at 530–31 (advocating a more deliberate consideration of 
goals and highlighting the conceptual and legal problems with reparations). Brophy draws 
attention to the insufªciency of the general conception of reparations while advocating for 
a less race speciªc reparative remedy. See id. at 509. 
88 See infra note 89. 
89 See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Conºict, African American Reparations, 
Tort Causation and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1193 (2004); 
Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 Geo. L.J. 2531 
(2001); Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the 
Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 651 (2003); Robert Westley, Foreword: 
Bridging the Public/Private Law Divide in African-American Reparations Discourse, 55 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 301 (2003); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African 
American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1269 (2003). 
90 See generally Mishael A. Danielson & Alexis Pimentel, Give Them Their Due: An African-
American Reparations Program Based on the Native American Federal Aid Model, 10 Wash. & Lee 
Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J. 89 (2004); Eva Jefferson Paterson, And Still We Rise, 6 Afr.-Am. L. 
& Pol’y Rep. 15 (2004); Alfreda Robinson, Troubling “Settled” Waters: The Opportunity and 
Peril of African-American Reparations, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 139 (2004). 
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law, political philosophy, and traditional civil rights scholarship.91 In 
order to assess the legal system’s capability to provide reparations for 
blacks, assumed within most of the foregoing literature, this article now 
turns to a brief review of black life under law from 1619–1972. 
II. The Foundations of the Reign of Terror 
 From the early seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century, 
American law served as a frequent adversary and only an occasional 
ally of African Americans.92 Across the American landscape during 
this time period, racially biased laws instantiated white supremacy and 
black subordination.93
 The racialization of slavery as a perpetual legal status for blacks 
and their descendants in the early colonial period represents a major 
milestone in the legal subordination of black people.94 Examination 
of the early development of Virginia law shows that the twenty 
“negers” that arrived in Virginia in 1619 experienced a form of servi-
tude similar to that of their white and Indian counterparts.95 By the 
mid-1600s, however, the law began to recognize a new category of la-
borer: blacks in perpetual servitude.96 Early deeds conveyed black 
women and their issue to whites for their “lifetime and their succes-
sors forever.”97 These conveyances, along with a 1640 legal decision 
mandating a punishment of three additional years of service for two 
white runaway servants, but a lifetime of service for their black ac-
complice, marked the beginning of a new status for blacks.98
 The introduction of this new status for these and other blacks in 
the Virginia colony represents a legal milestone in what this article 
identiªes as the “Reign of Terror.” Formerly, white and black servants, 
with or without indenture, were protected by law from various forms 
                                                                                                                      
91 See generally Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations Litigation Through the Eyes of the 
Movement, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 457 (2003); Joe R. Feagin, Documenting the Costs of 
Slavery, Segregation, and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations Are in Order for African Ameri-
cans, 20 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 49 (2004); Jordan, supra note 85; Edieth Y. Wu, Repara-
tions to African-Americans: The Only Remedy for the U.S. Government’s Failure to Enforce the 13th, 
14th, and 15th Amendments, 3 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 403 (2004). 
92 See infra Part III.A–B. 
93 See infra Part III.A–B. 
94 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 26–28. 
95 Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Towards the 
Negro, 1550–1812, at 73-74 (1968); Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 20. 
96 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 26–28. 
97 Id. at 26. 
98 Id. 
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of abuse, including mistreatment during their term of service, a de-
nial of payments upon their discharge, and felonious harm.99 The 
legislature removed these legal protections from blacks in Virginia, 
however, by enacting a statute acquitting slave masters for criminal 
charges for killing enslaved blacks while inºicting punishment.100 Vir-
ginia’s later legislation in 1680 became the model for black subordi-
nation throughout the nation.101 It forbade enslaved and “free” blacks 
from bearing arms of any type, required a certiªcation from masters 
for enslaved blacks to leave their masters’ plantations, prohibited en-
slaved and “free” blacks from defending themselves against whites, 
and sanctioned the killing of runaway blacks who resisted apprehen-
sion.102 In 1691, the Virginia legislature further illustrated the 
signiªcance of the new status of blacks through legislation that seri-
ously discouraged some and prevented other slave masters from the 
manumission or release of enslaved blacks.103 The act established that 
“no Negroes or mulattoes be set free by any person whatsoever, unless 
such person pay for the transportation of such Negro out of the coun-
try within six months . . . .”104 The statute imposed a ten pound pen-
alty upon offending slave masters for violating its provisions.105 Blacks 
freed in violation of the statute were to be seized and re-enslaved.106 
Within two decades, the Virginia legislature had foreclosed manumis-
sion for almost all enslaved blacks in the colony.107 Under the new 
statute, the governor and the legislature reserved the few manumis-
sions offered as a reward for blacks performing some “public ser-
vice.”108
 From the passage of the aforementioned legislation of 1680 on, 
pernicious laws covered almost all aspects of life for both the enslaved 
                                                                                                                      
99 An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves, Chapter XLIX, in 3 William Waller Hen-
ing, The Statutes at Large, at 447–48 (Oct. 1705) (providing a compilation of all the 
laws of Virginia from the ªrst session of the legislature in the year 1619), available at 
http://www.vagenweb.org/hening/vol03-25.htm. 
100 An Act about the Casual Killing of Slaves, Act I (Oct. 1669), in 2 Hening, supra note 
95, at 270–71, available at http://www.vagenweb.org/hening/vol02-13.htm. 
101 An Act Preventing Negroes Insurrection, Act X ( June 1680), in 2 Hening, supra 
note 95, at 481–82, available at http://www.vagenweb.org/hening/vol02-23.htm. 
102 Id. 
103 An Act for Suppressing Outlying Slaves, Act XVI (Apr. 1691), in 3 Hening, supra 
note 95, at 86–88, available at http://www.vagenweb.org/hening/vol03-06.htm [hereinaf-
ter An Act for Suppressing Outlying Slaves]. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 An Act for Suppressing Outlying Slaves, supra note 103, at 86–88. 
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and the free black throughout America.109 South Carolina, the ªrst 
colony with a black population exceeding that of whites, surpassed the 
harshness of Virginia laws with a statute passed in 1712.110 Of particu-
lar note were the penalties imposed for slaves who ran away or were in 
some way involved with supporting or encouraging escape attempts by 
others.111 To ensure that masters inºicted the prescribed penalties, 
the statute subjected them to both ªnes and forfeiture of their slaves 
if they failed to carry out the prescribed punishment.112
 “Free” blacks also suffered increasing erosion of their liberties as 
the rice economy grew in states such as South Carolina and the re-
strictions on enslaved blacks multiplied.113 A statute in 1740 high-
lighted the precarious status of “free” blacks by removing cases involv-
ing them from the regular courts to the slave court system under 
which the unsworn testimony of enslaved blacks and Indians could be 
offered against them.114 Moreover, the statute subjected “free” blacks 
to a ªne for “harboring slaves” and to the severe punishment of being 
sold at public auction upon non-payment of the ªne.115
 The legal proscriptions, limitations, and restrictions established 
during this period reºected the social boundaries of black life that 
blacks, as well as whites, were bound to recognize. Black subordination 
was not merely a reºection of white personal preference, but rather a 
socially mandated reality that ordered the punishment of whites and 
blacks who disregarded its dictates.116 Although many northern states 
                                                                                                                      
109 The law of slavery addressed all aspects of the enslaved’s life–health, freedom, mar-
riage, children, market value, and punishment. See generally Higginbotham, supra note 5. 
Although “free” blacks enjoyed more freedom than their enslaved counterparts, laws were 
likewise established regarding them in order to concretize the social order of white su-
premacy and black subordination. Id. at 203–09. 
110 Id. at 169–87. 
111 See id. at 176–77. Under the statute, persons encouraging escape were whipped and 
branded. See id. Those leaving the plantation without the intent to escape bondage were 
subject to forty lashes, branding on the right cheek, removal of an ear, castration and 
other punishment depending upon the number of previous offenses. See id. at 176–78. 
Blacks who ran away to escape slavery but were captured were punished by death, as were 
those who merely attempted to run away with the intent of gaining their freedom. See id. at 
176–77. 
112 See id. at 177. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 205. 
116 This is evident in colonial South Carolina’s restriction on manumission and the es-
tablished penalties for anyone who afforded enslaved blacks humane treatment. The 
Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 1836–1841, at 177 (Thomas Cooper & David J. 
McCord eds.,), cited in Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 169–87. The South Carolina law 
typiªes the racial laws of the period by providing for the punishment of whites as well as 
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passed anti-slavery legislation during other times, most of the states also 
maintained race-speciªc restrictions on their “free” black populations 
until one of the two periods cited above.117
III. American Legal History and Racial Subordination:  
Black Life from 1619-1972118
 This section reviews the harmful constraints that racially biased 
laws placed on blacks from 1619 to 1963 during the “Reign of Ter-
ror.”119 The survey is separated into an examination of laws governing 
enslaved and “free” blacks across the three centuries. Rather than pro-
viding a litany of the wide ranging laws directed to the black popula-
tion, it concentrates on laws governing three aspects of black life: edu-
cation and political rights, and economic freedoms. The foregoing 
areas provide insight into three fundamental aspects of African Ameri-
cans’ ability to participate individually and collectively in American so-
ciety. 
 The review then addresses the legislation and legal decisions ex-
tending formerly denied civil liberties to blacks. This period is desig-
nated as the “Reign of Rights.” The purpose in organizing the review in 
this way is to highlight the divergent and paradoxical uses of law re-
garding African Americans. Law originally mandated the mistreatment 
of enslaved and “free” blacks, until its recent use to proscribe the very 
treatment formerly required.120 This article likens the laws designed to 
                                                                                                                      
blacks who ran afoul of the mandated subjugation of both “free” and enslaved blacks. Id. at 
352. Additional examples of this are provided in the discussion below of economic and 
educational laws in antebellum America. 
117 Goodell, supra note 30, at 356–57. 
118 The following survey narrowly focuses upon restrictive laws placed on enslaved and 
“free” blacks. Laws governing the treatment of other racial groups were also prevalent 
during this time and were frequently in the same statutes. This survey, however, limits its 
consideration to the law’s impact upon blacks. 
119 Here, the term “Reign of Terror” describes the legally prescribed educational, po-
litical, and economic subordination of blacks. Scholars have traced the origins of the term 
“Reign of Terror” to the French Revolution’s bloodiest phase (1793–94), in which “terror-
ism” was deªned as “state-sponsored violence by the party in control of the government” 
and then used to consolidate power through intimidation. James Pfander, Charles Was First, 
Legal Affairs, May-June 2004, at 20, 20. The laws during the “Reign of Terror” referred 
to in this article functioned to maintain the subordinate status of blacks by authorizing 
police and private citizens to designate blacks who violated these laws as lawbreakers. 
120 These distinctions represent the predominant uses of law during the periods exam-
ined. As the survey below illustrates, in some cases jurisdictions awarded black Americans 
rights only to curtail, eviscerate, or eliminate them at some point in the future. See infra 
note 202 and accompanying text. The “Reign of Rights,” therefore, represents the most 
stable provision of rights afforded blacks in the past four hundred years, despite the sub-
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subordinate blacks during the “Reign of Terror” to the knife thrust 
nine inches into a person’s back in Malcolm X’s metaphor. The civil 
rights laws developed during the “Reign of Rights,” represent the re-
moval of the knife from the back of African American communities. 
Paradoxically, removing the knife completely from a stabbed person’s 
back can further the injury, unless the wound it created is treated. To 
wit, without treatment the person may bleed to death. Accordingly, this 
article contends that the civil rights laws during the “Reign of Rights” 
have been implemented in a way that obscures the necessity of repair-
ing the harms inºicted during the “Reign of Terror.” Thus the “Reign 
of Rights” has caused its own harm—much like removing a knife with-
out attending to the wound. Reparations, therefore, represent the in-
tentional treatment of the wound caused by the “Reign of Terror.” 
A. Laws Governing Enslaved Blacks 
1. Education 
 Generally, laws prohibited enslaved Africans from being edu-
cated.121 Although the laws governing slavery varied from place to 
place, certain general prohibitions held across the states and colonies; 
education was one activity that was consistently prohibited.122 Ken-
tucky and Maryland were the only two states that allowed slavery with-
out prohibitions against the education of enslaved blacks.123 The re-
maining states generally prohibited anyone from teaching enslaved 
blacks to read or write.124 Punishment for violating these laws ranged 
from as many as twenty lashes to a ªve hundred dollar ªne or an en-
tire year in jail.125
2. Political Rights 
 Although the American colonies exercised considerable political 
autonomy, the right to participate in self-governance was never ex-
tended to enslaved blacks. Charters in Maryland, Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and New Jersey all speciªed the enactment 
                                                                                                                      
sequent evisceration of a number of those legal rights by the United States Supreme Court 
from 1978 to the present. See infra Part III.C. 
121 Goodell, supra note 30, at 319–25. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 323–24. 
124 Id. at 319–25. 
125 Id. at 319, 321. 
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of legislation only with “consent of the freemen.”126 In the original 
colonies and the states later joining the union, the law uniformly ex-
cluded enslaved Africans from participation in governance.127 This 
exclusion barred their involvement in choosing representation, hold-
ing ofªce, and voting on political decisions.128 Furthermore, discuss-
ing abolition or other matters tending to produce discontent with the 
enslaved was a high crime in some states resulting in imprisonment or 
possibly death.129
3. Economic Freedoms 
 Enslaved Africans had no legal rights to property–real or other-
wise.130 As property themselves, in most places whatever goods the en-
slaved claimed as their own could be taken to the justice of the peace 
by any white person, who was then entitled to half of its value with the 
remainder going to the court or the state.131 Laws also regularly denied 
the enslaved both ownership of livestock and land that they could har-
vest for sale, although Louisiana allowed slaves to cultivate land for 
their own food.132 Louisiana followed Roman law (peculium), which al-
lowed slaves to keep a portion the “property” allotted to them by their 
masters.133 Besides that limited portion, Louisiana law conformed to 
other states’ laws establishing that the master owned all the possessions 
of enslaved blacks.134 State laws also prohibited the enslaved from ob-
taining real or personal property by means of a gift or through the pro-
visions of a will.135 Furthermore, the enslaved were also restricted from 
transferring property through either of these means.136
                                                                                                                      
126 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 114 (examining rights enjoyed in these early 
colonies). Colonists in Massachusetts established the Mayºower compact and only two 
colonies did not include self-governance provisions in their formation: New York and 
Georgia. Id. at 114, 218–20. 
127 Id. at 218--20. 
128 Id. In the original colonies, disenfranchisement was not limited to enslaved 
blacks—Indians, women, and anyone without property was also disenfranchised. See gener-
ally Higginbotham, supra note 5. The enslaved uniquely counted as 3/5 of a person for 
purposes of representation, however, under the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
129 See Goodell, supra note 30, at 322–23. 
130 See id. at 89. 
131 Id. at 90–92. 
132 Id. at 135. 
133 Id. at 90–92. 
134 Id. at 90. 
135 Goodell, supra note 30, at 90–92. 
136 Id. at 90. 
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 With few exceptions, the enslaved had limited means to improve 
their material condition despite industry and thrift.137 In Georgia, the 
1750 slave law prohibited slave masters from allowing the enslaved to be 
apprenticed to a craftsman or from being lent out to perform any work 
other than crop cultivation.138 The enslaved could not enter into con-
tracts except on behalf of a master and, as a rule, others could not hire 
them out for their own beneªt.139 Masters allowing enslaved blacks to 
hire themselves out, as well those who hired them, were subject to sub-
stantial ªnes.140 The law also denied the enslaved the ability to pur-
chase anything for themselves or sell anything for their own beneªt.141 
As with hiring enslaved blacks, “trucking or trading” with the enslaved 
for their own beneªt was an offense punishable by ªne.142 Accordingly, 
by proscribing the enslaved from lawfully obtaining property or exercis-
ing ownership rights such as transferring property to their children or 
loved ones, the law barred the enslaved from creating or gaining wealth 
individually or collectively regardless of their frugality or industry.143
B. Pre-Civil War and Post-Civil War Laws Governing Free Blacks  
 Heavy legal constraints existed upon “free” blacks144 in America 
from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.145 All of the original 
colonies and the states passed extensive legislation concerning and lim-
iting the “free” blacks both before and after the Civil War.146 Through 
                                                                                                                      
137 See id. at 97–99. 
138 Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 251. 
139 Goodell, supra note 30, at 97–99. 
140 Id. at 98–99. 
141 Id. at 89. 
142 Id. at 97–100. 
143 Despite the legal prohibitions against gaining personal property, enslaved blacks 
with willing slave masters could occasionally use cunning and thrift to buy freedom for 
themselves and others. Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries 
of Slavery in North America 275 (1998). 
144 In 1790, there were an estimated 59,557 “free” blacks—relative to 697,624 enslaved 
blacks and a total of 757,181 blacks across the newly formed nation. Bureau of the U.S. 
Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915, 
at C3.2:N31 (1968). The number of “free” blacks had increased to 108,435 by 1800, as the 
number of enslaved blacks had grown to 893,602. Id. 
145 Before undertaking this study, the author thought that “free” blacks enjoyed greater 
equality under the law before the Jim Crow era. 
146 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 100–38 (discussing the life of “free” blacks dur-
ing the colonial period). See generally John Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage 
in the United States 1 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1862) for consideration of legislation 
governing enslaved and “free” black in the colonial and later periods. 
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law, states and colonies designated “free” blacks as a subordinate class 
without the fundamental rights and privileges afforded whites.147
 Of the multiplicity of race-based constraints before the Civil War, 
two rested at the foundation of the “free” blacks relationship to the 
law: the inability to testify against a white person in a court of law and 
the threat of enslavement or re-enslavement.148 The restriction against 
testifying against whites barred “free” blacks from basic legal protec-
tions—they were without legal recourse to protect their property, 
their liberty, or their families without a white benefactor who would 
testify on their behalf.149 Thus, “free” blacks without white employers 
or respected white friends lived at great peril, and with little recourse 
to the law for protection. 
 The constant threat of enslavement served to dissuade “free” 
blacks from entertaining notions of legal equality.150 Under federal, 
state, and colonial law, “free” blacks were subject to enslavement for the 
ªrst time or re-enslavement based on a wide variety of circumstances.151 
This penalty was common in the laws governing residency and travel.152 
Slaveholding states regularly required freed blacks to leave the state or 
else be sold back into slavery, or prohibited the immigration of “free” 
blacks into the jurisdiction.153 Other states forbade travel by “free” 
blacks out of the state and mandated their sale into slavery should they 
return.154 Georgia, Maryland and other states prohibited “free” blacks 
from coming to the state upon penalty of being sold into slavery.155 
Some states forbade free black sailors from disembarking in their states, 
or “quarantined” ships that employed black sailors.156 Moreover, “free” 
blacks were regularly subject to the designs of enslavers and slave 
catchers seeking to place them in, or return them to, a state of perpet-
ual bondage.157 In the Northwest Territory, “free” blacks were required 
                                                                                                                      
147 The extensive restraints governed almost all aspects of life. See Goodell, supra note 
30, at 355–57. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 357. 
150 See id. at 355–56. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 355, 360–61. 
153 Goodell, supra note 30, at 355–56. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 363. 
157 See id. at 355. 
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to bring a sizeable ªnancial bond, a certiªcate of freedom, and other 
written documents to take residence there.158
 Following the Civil War, the status of the “freedmen” approxi-
mated in many respects the tenuous subordinate position held by “free” 
blacks in antebellum America.159 As a general matter, southern whites 
still regarded the masses of blacks as inherent inferiors subordinate to 
them and their interests.160 In reporting to President Andrew Johnson, 
after a tour of the South in 1865, former Union General Carl Schurz 
wrote: 
Wherever I go—the street, the shop, the house, the hotel, or 
the steamboat—I hear the people talk in such a way as to in-
dicate that they are yet unable to conceive of the Negro as 
possessing any rights at all. Men who are honorable in their 
dealings with their white neighborhoods, will cheat a Negro 
without feeling a single twinge of their honor. To kill a Negro, 
they do not deem murder; to debauch a Negro woman, they 
do not think fornication; to take the property away from a 
Negro, they do not consider robbery.161
 As evidenced in the Supreme Court’s decision striking down the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875, the idea that blacks continued to lack the le-
gal rights and privileges enjoyed by whites in post-Civil War America 
                                                                                                                      
158 See Stephen Middleton, The Black Laws in the Old Northwest: A Documen-
tary History 15–18, 199–205, 291–307, 346 (1993) (discussing restrictions in Ohio, 
Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana). 
159 DuBois, supra note 44, at 139. Elaborating on this situation DuBois writes, “[t]he 
Negro’s access to the land was hindered and limited; his right to work was curtailed; his 
right of self-defense was taken away, when his right to bear arms was stopped; and his em-
ployment was reduced to contract labor with penal servitude as a punishment for leaving 
his job.” Id. at 167. The following quote from a committee of the Florida legislature in 
1865 helps illustrate the point: 
But it will hardly be seriously challenged that the simple act of emancipation 
of itself worked any change in the social, legal or political status of such of the 
African race as were already free. Nor will it be insisted, we presume, that the 
emancipated slave technically denominated a “freedman” occupied any 
higher position in the scale of rights and privileges than did the “free Negro.” 
If these inferences be correct, then it results as a logical conclusion, that all 
the arguments going to sustain the authority of the General Assembly to dis-
criminate in the case of “free Negroes” equally apply to that of “freedmen,” or 
emancipated slaves. 
Id. at 139. 
160 Id. at 136–37. 
161 Id. at 136. 
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was in no way limited to southerners.162 Writing for the majority, in 
the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley offered the following: 
There were thousands of free colored people in this country 
before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential 
rights of life, liberty, and property the same as white citizens; 
yet no one, at that time, thought it was any invasion of their 
personal status as freemen because they were not admitted to 
all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens . . . .163
The majority’s revisionist claims regarding “free” blacks’ equal enjoy-
ment of “the essential rights, of life, liberty, and property” before the 
Civil War clearly ignores the degraded liberty and property rights pro-
vided “free” blacks.164 Moreover, as Justice Harlan points out in his 
lone dissent, the majority’s claims ignore the Court’s landmark deci-
sion in Dred Scott v. Sanford rejecting a black person’s ability to claim 
the rights enjoyed by whites under the Constitution: 
The judgment of the court was that the words ‘people of the 
United States’ and ‘citizens’ meant the same thing, both de-
scribing ‘the political body who, according to our republican 
institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power and 
conduct the government through their representatives;’ that 
‘they are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and 
every citizen is one of this people and a constituent member 
of this sovereignty;’ but that the class of persons described in 
the plea in abatement did not compose a portion of this 
people, were not ‘included, and were not intended to be in-
cluded, under the word ‘citizens’ in the constitution;’ that, 
therefore, they could ‘claim none of the rights and privileges 
which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of 
the United States’ . . . .165
1. Education 
 “Free” blacks often experienced segregation and discrimination in 
their search for education for themselves or their children, and before 
                                                                                                                      
162 See Rubio, supra note 49, at 59–61 (discussing The Civil Rights Cases and the sup-
posed “special treatment” of blacks by the Court). 
163 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
164 See supra Part III.B. 
165 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 31–32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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the Civil War, express prohibitions on educating “free” blacks.166 The 
laws governing the education of “free” blacks prior to Reconstruction 
may be divided into three types. The least common type barred teach-
ing “free” blacks to read or write under any circumstance.167 These laws 
were in place in Georgia and Alabama.168 Virginia, South Carolina, and 
Ohio, in contrast, allowed the instruction of individual “free” blacks but 
prohibited “meetings” or schools to educate “free” blacks.169 Other 
common prohibitions excluded blacks from public education or segre-
gated their attendance in schools.170 In Ohio, Missouri, and Indiana, 
legislation barred blacks from attending any public school, and in Mas-
sachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld de jure segregation un-
der the state constitution.171
 Following the Civil War, legally mandated segregation in education 
blossomed in the South while it gradually declined in the North.172 In 
the South, segregation became the norm for public education.173 
Through legislative action, state ofªcials consistently provided unequal 
funding to African American schools as compared with their white 
counterparts.174 Discrimination by legislatures in funding segregated 
schools also included substantial discrepancies in the salaries of black 
and white teachers with comparable qualiªcations.175 In many instances, 
schools for blacks only came about through the funding of black par-
ents and white philanthropists.176 In some cases, post-Reconstruction 
governments of the South refused to fund black education and, in 
other cases, ofªcials opposed the establishment of schools regardless of 
                                                                                                                      
166 See Goodell, supra note 30, at 319–25 (discussing the educations of enslaved and 
“free” blacks). 
167 Hurd, supra note 146, at 105, 151. 
168 Id. 
169 Goodell, supra note 30, at 319–21. 
170 Hurd, supra note 146, at 170. 
171 Id. 
172 De facto segregation in education characterizes the historical and the contempo-
rary reality for northern areas with large black populations. DuBois, supra note 44, at 637–
69. Integrated education in areas with sizable black student bodies has never been a norm 
for American society. Id. In the South, law prevented it and in the North, practice pre-
vented it. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 717 (1974) (highlighting the way local gov-
ernment and school ofªcials in the North maintained school segregation in the absence of 
de jure legislation). 
173 Following the Civil War, southern states adopted Jim Crow laws governing educa-
tion. DuBois, supra note 44, at 637–69. 
174 Roy L. Brooks, Integration or Separation: A Strategy for Racial Equality 9 
(1996). 
175 Id. 
176 See DuBois, supra note 44, at 642–44. 
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funding.177 As illustrated by Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond 
County, school ofªcials could close schools or refuse to fund entire lev-
els of education for blacks despite its availability for whites.178
 In its 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision, the Supreme Court upheld 
de jure segregation by the states.179 The precedent established in Plessy 
continued as the law of the land until the 1954 Supreme Court decision 
in Brown v. the Board of Education.180 The legally established discrepan-
cies in teacher salaries, supplies, and facilities continued at various lev-
els until well after 1954, when southern states and counties brought 
additional legal suits to challenge the implementation of Brown.181
2. Political Rights 
 Prior to 1865, “free” blacks encountered regular but varying bars 
to their participation in the political realm.182 Of the thirteen original 
colonies, only Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina expressly 
denied “free” blacks the elective franchise before the Revolutionary 
War.183 Nonetheless, as time passed, most of the remaining colonies 
withdrew the voting rights originally provided to “free” blacks.184 Mary-
land’s original Declaration of Rights established in 1776, stated, “[e]very 
                                                                                                                      
177 Id. at 646–47. 
178 Cumming v. Bd. of Educ. of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 537 (1899) (uphold-
ing the Board of Education’s use of tax funds to build a new high school for white children 
despite its refusal to fund a high school for blacks). 
179 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896). 
180 Prior to Brown, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions requiring states to 
provide equal funding for segregated school systems including the establishment of gradu-
ate and professional schools to accommodate black students. See Brooks, supra note 174, 
at 10. States that did not offer an equal alternative were required to allow blacks to attend 
the white schools. See id. 
181 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (initiating a 
lengthy series of lawsuits by state and local governments regarding the implementation of 
Brown I ). 
182 See generally Emil Olbrich, The Development of Sentiment on Negro Suffrage 
to 1860 (1969). 
183 In 1715, North Carolina expressly excluded blacks and Indians from voting. Id. at 8. 
This exclusion was dropped in a 1735 law restricting the franchise to freeholders. Id. South 
Carolina barred the voting and election privileges of blacks and Indians through a 1716 
law, and Virginia barred the election privileges of blacks and Indians in 1705 and the vot-
ing privileges in 1762. Id. Although a Georgia election law of 1761 did not bar blacks from 
voting, its preamble stated that only free white men with the proper qualiªcations should 
be able to vote. Id. at 7–9. 
184 Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania 
chose not to disenfranchise blacks expressly. Olbrich, supra note 182, at 17–24. Nonethe-
less, popular sentiment still restricted “free” blacks exercise of the franchise in these states. 
Id. at 14. 
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man having property in, a common interest with, and an attachment to 
the community, ought to have a right of suffrage.”185 By 1809, however, 
attitudes had changed and legislation was passed to restrict the elective 
franchise to white men.186 Consequently, by 1865 only Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island provided equal 
franchise to “free” black men.187 Although New York allowed “free” 
black men to vote prior to 1865, it required a substantial monetary 
payment from them not required of whites.188
 Between 1790 and 1796, Kentucky, Vermont, and Tennessee all 
joined the Union without racial discrimination in the suffrage provi-
sions of their constitutions.189 Further, in 1799 Kentucky restricted the 
franchise to free white men in a new constitution.190 In its initial con-
stitution of 1802, Ohio also kept the franchise from “free” black 
men.191 Tennessee did likewise through provisions in its 1834 consti-
tution limit suffrage to white men.192 From 1844 to 1857, Missouri, 
Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, and California each de-
nied black men the franchise through racially discriminatory constitu-
tional provisions.193 In most cases, the decision resulted from the di-
rect vote of the electorate in the state.194 In 1847, Wisconsin also 
decided, by referendum, to deny black suffrage.195 In 1849, however, 
the question was resubmitted to the Wisconsin voters and black suf-
frage passed by a small margin with less than one third of the persons 
voting in the election casting a vote on the question.196 Because of the 
low percentage of votes cast on black suffrage, blacks did not receive 
the elective franchise in Wisconsin until 1866 when the state Supreme 
Court validated the seventeen year old election results on black suf-
frage.197
                                                                                                                      
185 Hurd, supra note 146, at 19. 
186 Id. at 19. 
187 Of the original colonies, New Jersey and Connecticut expressly disenfranchised 
“free” blacks as did most of the other states who joined the union. Olbrich, supra note 
182, at 23–24. 
188 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 261. 
189 Id. at 21. 
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191 Id. at 22. 
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 The opposition to black suffrage ºowed from widespread notions 
of black inferiority and the commonly held fear of black immigration 
to the state.198 The following view of a Michigan constitutional dele-
gate reºects another important sentiment held at the time: 
Negroes were more enlightened and happy in America than 
back in Africa . . . . The obligations of justice had been more 
than satisªed, and the people of Michigan were not bound to 
be so imprudent as to divide their political authority with ne-
groes, or to let them have a share in piloting the ship of state 
on which they had been suffered to become passengers.199
By barring the franchise from “free” black men, the aforementioned 
states removed blacks’ opportunity to play the most basic role in the 
political governance of their lives or their communities.200 As the fol-
lowing section will show, denying blacks the franchise prevented them 
from gaining political power in their communities that could threaten 
the country’s ubiquitous racial hierarchy. 
 With the ratiªcation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 and 
the continued protection of Union troops in the former confederate 
territories, black men in the South quickly became involved in politics. 
African Americans were placed in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, the United States Senate, hundreds of local ofªces, and on a 
state supreme court.201 Less than ten years later, however, the tables 
turned.202 The South had unseated its black elected ofªcials and again 
                                                                                                                      
198 Across the state constitutional conventions, opponents of black suffrage regularly 
contested the black franchise because of its potential to attract “free” blacks to the state. See 
Olbrich, supra note 182, at 79, 90–92, 95, 100–02. 
199 Id. at 97. 
200 The disenfranchisement of “free” black men had unique signiªcance in that it rep-
resented the complete disenfranchisement of all blacks regardless of their gender, wealth, 
or servitude. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
201 Klarman, supra note 6, at 10. 
202 This provides one example of the instability of black rights. Rather than a slow and 
steady march toward freedom, blacks living through the “Reign of Terror,” at best mean-
dered to America’s discordant refrain of rights and liberties. See Higginbotham, supra 
note 5, at 32–40. Subsequent generations of blacks often experienced the removal of rights 
and privileges that their foreparents enjoyed. Id. The original Africans in the colonies 
came as indentured servants, but within two generations blacks and their progeny had 
become enslaved chattel in perpetuity. DuBois, supra note 44, at 417–40. In Maryland, 
Tennessee, New Jersey, and other states, blacks who enjoyed voting rights during one pe-
riod had them legally removed from subsequent generations. Id. This pattern occurred 
again following Reconstruction when blacks reached high political ofªces only to lose 
these ofªces and the right to vote in a twenty year time span. John Hope Franklin, Legal 
Disenfranchisement of the Negro 215–241 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992). The rights 
 
240 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:207 
denied black men the franchise, while the North had permanently ex-
tended political citizenship rights.203 By 1878, southern ofªcials had 
begun the systematic exclusion of blacks, who represented a majority in 
many southern counties, from political involvement.204 In addition to 
physical violence and the destruction of homes and crops, southern 
whites used legal enactments and referenda, ultimately upheld by state 
and federal judiciaries, to prevent black political involvement.205 Ar-
kansas, Florida, and Tennessee passed legislation to bar black participa-
tion, while Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia all modiªed their constitutions to 
exclude blacks through poll taxes and registration requirements.206 
White ofªcials selectively administered new registration requirements 
to legitimate the exclusion of blacks from political participation.207 
Along with violence and intimidation, racially discriminatory voting 
laws governed the political participation of the vast majority of African 
Americans until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.208
3. Economic Freedoms 
 To maintain economic subordination, white ofªcials systematically 
and tenaciously used antebellum and post-reconstruction law to deny 
“free” blacks the opportunity to compete fairly with whites and to amass 
wealth.209 Legally imposed restraints, common against “free” blacks 
both before and after the Civil War, greatly limited their ability to pro-
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vide for themselves and their families.210 These laws regularly limited 
their employment as well as their enterprise opportunities.211
 The greatest economic threat facing “free” blacks was the con-
stant danger of enslavement.212 The majority of the states passed laws 
prohibiting “free” blacks from immigrating into their jurisdictions, 
subjecting violators to a substantial ªne and enslavement.213 Besides 
these common prohibitions on travel and the threat of slave catchers 
and kidnappers, colonies and states implemented additional legal 
mechanisms that placed “free” blacks at considerable risk. The Dis-
trict of Columbia provides one interesting example. In 1820, the fed-
eral government disenfranchised the “free” blacks of Washington D.C. 
by limiting the election of city ofªcers to white citizens.214 Congress 
granted a special power to these ofªcers to set the terms and condi-
tions of residence for “free” blacks in the city.215 By ordinance, in 1827 
the ofªcers set several restrictions on “free” blacks present in the dis-
trict.216 These restrictions included registering their presence, obtain-
ing two freehold sureties of ªve hundred dollars for their good behav-
ior, and proving their freedom.217 Further, the ordinance required 
that any black person unable to prove their freedom would be sold 
into slavery.218 Along similar lines, Florida law required that a “free” 
black who failed to satisfy a judgment for a debt within ªve days be 
sold at an auction to satisfy the debt.219 Perhaps the most egregious of 
these laws were those found in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Delaware, 
Georgia and Illinois, allowing authorities to hire out “free” blacks as 
lifetime “servants” when they deemed it proper.220
 In addition to these laws, states and colonies placed a multitude 
of legal restrictions on “free” blacks’ ownership rights and employ-
ment opportunities. In the early eighteenth century, New York and 
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New Jersey excluded “free” blacks from owning real property.221 More 
than a century later, the United States Congress excluded “free” 
blacks from homesteading opportunities in the Paciªc Northwest.222 
During the same time period, California restricted blacks from the 
homesteading within its borders.223 Some states speciªcally prohibited 
“free” blacks from owning a white Christian indentured servant.224 In 
such cases, the blacks’ purchase of such a servant was deemed to ac-
quit the indenture.225 Financially, some states required “free” blacks to 
make greater contributions in taxes than whites: Georgia required 
“free” blacks to pay a tax on their own heads (six times higher than 
masters paid per head for enslaved blacks), and South Carolina 
placed an exclusive capitation tax on “free” blacks.226
 The most extensive legal constraints on “free” blacks’ economic 
opportunities, however, related to employment or enterprise in the 
South. These laws restricted a wide range of engagements for “free” 
blacks including handicraft, pioneering, trading, print setting, retail 
clerking, home repair, masonry, mechanics, home construction and 
repair, law, and carrying or handling the United States mails.227 Se-
vere racial distinctions in the law otherwise governing “free” blacks 
further restricted their economic liberty.228
 States’ and colonies’ general prohibition against “free” blacks 
testifying against whites also severely limited their ability to protect 
their earnings or enforce contracts against whites.229 In some states, 
challenging whites itself had legal ramiªcations. In Louisiana, “free” 
blacks were subject to imprisonment for conceiving of themselves as 
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equal with whites and showing them disrespect or making an insult.230 
Even when “free” blacks owned property, discriminatory laws pre-
vented them from protecting those rights by force of arms or law.231
 After the Civil War, Southern states passed the Black Codes which 
placed further restrictions on African American economic opportu-
nity.232 For example, through these codes, white police ofªcers had the 
authority to arrest and ªne blacks as vagrants if they were not employed 
by a white person.233 Although reconstructed southern legislatures an-
nulled the most offensive aspects of these codes by 1868, a new system 
rose from its ashes at the close of the reconstruction era.234 South Caro-
lina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Virginia, Arkan-
sas, and North Carolina each enacted new similar vagrancy laws be-
tween 1893 and 1909.235 Under the new regime, authorities arrested 
blacks on vagaries such as idleness or immorality if they “had no prop-
erty to support them.”236 Once arrested, authorities would require 
blacks to work for a white planter to pay their ªne and court costs.237 
Blacks were then required to work for the planter who would also 
charge them for food and lodging.238 These charges invariably equaled 
or exceeded the earnings the black workers were entitled to at the end 
of the year.239 Consequently, the original ªne the workers were re-
quired to pay off would never be liquidated and the workers would ªnd 
themselves unable to free themselves from the relationship.240
 This system of near servitude was sometimes coupled with convict-
leasing, a practice that operated in many parts of the South well into 
the twentieth century.241 Under convict-leasing, white ofªcials would 
arrest African Americans on some minor misdemeanor and charge 
them a ªne and substantial court fees.242 At the courthouse, a white 
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employer would pay the ªne and fees in exchange for working off the 
debt.243 Most blacks who refused the offer found themselves leased out 
on a chain gang or other prison work unit to work in the mines or to 
build roads, bridges, and railroads.244 Through this and similar laws, 
blacks found themselves locked into an inescapable cycle of debt and 
work.245
 Whites excluded blacks from law enforcement, and from judicial, 
legal, and other public ofªces throughout the South, despite the 
signiªcant number of blacks in southern communities.246 Teaching and 
administrating segregated schools represented the one public sector 
position that was generally available to blacks. Nonethelss, as shown in 
Alston v. School Board of Norfolk, Va., southern states routinely paid blacks 
substantially less money for the same teaching jobs.247 The Supreme 
Court’s earlier ruling in the Civil Rights Cases protected the right of 
whites to discriminate against blacks in the private sector. The public 
sector generally followed the same practice until Brown v Board of Educa-
tion.248
 Further, routine and lawful discrimination against blacks also de-
nied them entry into higher education, which severely restricted their 
ability to gain the skills and knowledge needed to enter certain careers 
and occupations. Further, states discriminated against black land grant 
colleges by providing limited funding for their operation.249 Black col-
leges’ curriculums offered very little beyond education courses.250 In-
stead of mechanical or professional training, black land grant colleges 
could only offer courses in limited areas such as shoe-making and re-
pair, tailoring, and carpentry.251
 In the southern private sector, whites paid blacks lower wages for 
the same work in both agricultural and limited industrial positions.252 
Lawful discrimination in the credit sector foreclosed the opportunity 
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to obtain ªnancing for a majority of blacks.253 Lenders regularly de-
nied blacks’ requests for credit.254 This practice, in conjunction with 
mob violence by whites, functioned to keep blacks in a subordinate, 
non-competitive economic position.255
 Following the civil war, blacks in northern cities also faced substan-
tial discrimination in employment, housing, and access to credit.256 La-
bor unions, employers, and private individuals legally discriminated 
against blacks with impunity.257 The preference for whites in employ-
ment provided job opportunities to newly arrived European immi-
grants that were unavailable to black workers.258 In housing, private 
restrictive covenants prohibiting sales to African Americans were in 
force and upheld in court.259 In the absence of strict Jim Crow laws, 
however, northern blacks still enjoyed more freedom than their south-
ern counterparts. The North thus attracted large numbers of blacks 
hoping to escape the Black Codes and lynching laws that openly ruled 
in the South. In response to the inºux of blacks from the South into 
northern cities, urban white residents increasingly utilized the ultimate 
economic constraint on blacks: violence.260
 The federal government also participated in the economic subor-
dination of blacks through the administration of its programs and its 
employment policies.261 President Woodrow Wilson lawfully instituted 
segregation policies in federal employment in 1913 and continued the 
military segregation policies that limited blacks’ opportunities to ad-
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vance through the military ranks.262 During the New Deal, the federal 
government instituted a host of federal programs that were intended to 
aid Americans in a wide range of areas. These programs, however, rou-
tinely discriminated against blacks in employment, housing, and fund-
ing.263 New Deal programs provided special ªnancial assistance to white 
farmers, businesses, and bankers that were unavailable to blacks.264 The 
Federal Housing Administration discriminated against blacks in obtain-
ing housing subsidies and supported racially restrictive covenants that 
barred blacks from purchasing many homes.265 During this period pre-
ceding and following World War II, the federal government offered 
numerous programs to aid white contractors, builders, and other busi-
nesses that were unavailable to their black counterparts.266
 The foregoing laws illustrate a very critical characteristic of the 
“Reign of Terror:” racism as legal right and obligation. Under the laws 
above and those articulated below, the mistreatment of and discrimi-
nation against blacks often represented a legal obligation. One consis-
tent aspect of many of the laws passed was the imposition of penalties 
upon white who failed to follow the laws.267 Rather than the actions of 
a select group of unenlightened white persons, the subordination and 
exclusion of blacks constituted the politically and socially mandated 
conduct for all whites.268 This political mandate, moreover, ºowed 
from democratic institutions at the heart of American society, rather 
than from a tyrannical imposition forced upon citizens by their gov-
ernment. Discriminatory laws were passed by freely elected legisla-
tures.269 Generally, these laws stood as reºections of communal desire 
to maintain the subordination and servitude of free blacks.270
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C.  Civil Rights for African Americans 
 After the Civil War, two sets of competing laws were passed con-
cerning African Americans. At the state level, many southern govern-
ments adopted Black Codes that established a quasi system of slavery.271 
At the federal level, however, a series of constitutional amendments 
were ratiªed that promised blacks equal treatment before the law. The 
13th Amendment prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude,272 the 
14th Amendment promised equal protection before the law,273 and the 
15th Amendment provided black men with enfranchisement.274 In the 
South, all three of these amendments were effectively nulliªed through 
racially neutral state laws and private actions held beyond the reach of 
constitutional protections by the Supreme Court.275 Additionally, the 
reconstruction Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, restricting Klan 
activity, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting some forms of pri-
vate discrimination.276 Both of these laws were later ruled unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court.277 In the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court began to require that states provide equal 
services under segregation. By 1954, the federal government had be-
gun to prohibit discrimination and segregation in its own practices 
concerning the military and some federal employment.278
 After Brown, federal courts began to ªnd segregation in a variety of 
areas unconstitutional.279 Ten years after Brown, Congress joined the 
courts in challenging racial discrimination against blacks in public ac-
commodations, employment, and the use of federal funds.280 Congress 
went on the next year to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Fair 
Housing Act in 1968, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
(EEO Act) in 1972 barring discrimination in the elections process, 
housing, and guiding afªrmative employment practices, respectively.281 
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None of these acts, however, focused speciªcally upon African Ameri-
cans as a group or the actions necessary to repair the individual and 
collective harms visited upon blacks over the preceding one hundred 
years. Instead, each statute prohibits discrimination generally based on 
race, color, or national origin.282 Together, these statutes extend the 
civil liberties enjoyed by whites to blacks and others, but still fall short 
of the full sense of liberation advocated by abolitionists Benjamin 
Franklin and Wendell Phillips and elaborated by moral philosopher 
Timothy Jackson. Consequently, the legislation protects the rights of all 
Americans—black, white, and otherwise—against racial discrimination. 
But the laws fail to move toward the goal of reparations: to provide 
blacks with the educational, political, and economic resources neces-
sary to enable them to fully exercise and enjoy their civil liberties.283
 The foregoing analysis provides a glimpse, albeit abbreviated, 
into the legal regime governing the lives of African Americans from 
their initial arrival in Virginia to the passage of the EEO Act of 1972. 
The sketch illustrates that positive law functioned as the formal means 
by which whites denied African Americans their humanity and their 
citizenship over four centuries.284
 The sketch also demonstrates that, in contrast, during the latter 
part of the twentieth century, law served as the formal means by which 
the federal government required state governments and private citizens 
to cease and desist from discriminatory acts against persons based on 
race.285 In other words, this period reversed the legal subordination 
that characterized so much of African Americans’ experience over the 
previous four centuries. These civil rights laws were instituted to pro-
scribe discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, and of-
fered protection to all Americans from mistreatment and discrimina-
tion.286 Through investigating both the laws used to deny African 
Americans’ humanity and citizenship, and the laws intended to protect 
them, this article highlights a fundamental limitation of the later: 
rather than remedying the past effects of the laws denying African 
American humanity and citizenship, civil rights laws merely prohibited 
future denials of the humanity and citizenship rights of its residents 
and citizens. These laws represent crucial legislation to direct and en-
force the reordering of social relations to prevent the types of harms 
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suffered by African Americans and others from being visited upon any-
one in the future, but they leave the question of repairing past wrongs 
unaddressed.287
D. An Analysis of the Legal Issues 
 In light of the damage done to African Americans and their 
communities educationally, politically, and economically by the law, 
civil rights laws represented a needed yet insufªcient response by fed-
eral, state, and local governments. Today, civil rights laws are crucial 
to support the ideas of fairness and justice for all races in American 
relations. These laws are the primary formal means of ensuring that 
race no longer justiªes legal inferiority.288 They do not offer remedies, 
however, for the regular and recurring disenfranchisement of African 
Americans that was experienced by “free” and enslaved blacks in both 
the North and the South.289 Likewise, civil rights laws fail to offer any 
remedial scheme to redress the systematic exclusion of the enslaved 
and “free” blacks from equitable participation in the economic sys-
tem. Civil rights laws have reversed the centuries-old practice of ex-
cluding African Americans from public educational institutions and 
inequitably funding black schools at the tertiary, secondary, and pri-
mary levels of education.290 These laws do not mention how to rem-
edy three centuries of educational exclusion affecting over seventeen 
generations of African Americans.291
 Under the “Reign of Terror,” most statutes, ordinances, and deci-
sions regarding African Americans focused on the conduct of en-
slaved and “free” blacks.292 Even when legislation penalized whites for 
their interaction or involvement with blacks, the true purpose of the 
laws was to prevent African Americans from exercising certain free-
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doms reserved for whites.293 An example of this is seen in the fairly 
common legislation in most states proscribing enslaved blacks from 
buying or selling goods.294 Under these laws, whites would be penal-
ized, though not as harshly as their black counterparts, for buying, 
selling, or trading with blacks. Other examples were laws prohibiting 
blacks from being taught to read or from hiring themselves out “for 
work on their own account.”295 Blacks caught violating these laws were 
punished for reading, trading, or hiring themselves out, while whites 
charged with violating these statutes were penalized for their support 
or encouragement of unlawful conduct by blacks.296
 The “Reign of Rights,” in contrast, directs its focus upon the be-
havior of those who would deny persons the liberty to engage in cov-
ered activities. The Fair Housing Act focuses upon the conduct of per-
sons using race, color, or national origin to deny housing to someone 
else.297 Likewise, Title VII focuses upon the improper conduct of those 
who base hiring, promotion and other job opportunities on race, color, 
or national origin.298 Public accommodations legislation also looks 
speciªcally at actions taken to deny persons access to public accommo-
dations based on their race color or national origin.299 In each of the 
foregoing statutes, the legislation seeks to prevent the denial of rights 
based on some impermissible criterion such as race. Persons found 
guilty of violating these statutes are required to cease such conduct and 
to allow persons discriminated against to participate in the governed 
activity.300
 One way of understanding these laws in relation to African 
Americans’ legal history would be that the “Reign of Terror” inºicted 
harm upon enslaved and “free” blacks because of their race, and that 
the “Reign of Rights” guards their descendants against similar harm 
based on their race. In this light, the essential role of civil rights law 
for blacks today is to protect them from the type of treatment visited 
upon their ancestors.301 Moreover, the “Reign of Rights” goes beyond 
                                                                                                                      
293 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 26–28 (considering the motivations of legisla-
tures, judges, and others in establishing the laws governing black life). 
294 See supra text accompanying note 131–36, 140. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 138–40. 
296 See supra notes 130–143 and accompanying text. 
297 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968). 
298 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964). 
299 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a). 
300 Equal Protection, supra note 232, at 267–74, 289–91. 
301 During the “Reign of Terror” others suffered substantial discrimination as well. Na-
tive Americans, immigrants, and other racial minorities were victimized under the system, 
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the protection of blacks from racially-based harms—it protects Lati-
nos, Asians, Native Americans, and other minority groups from such 
mistreatment as well.302 The laws likewise extend to whites.303 Al-
though no governmentally sanctioned injustices have been perpe-
trated against whites because they were white, extending civil rights 
protection to them was also necessary to ensure that no citizens found 
themselves the victims of the kinds of harms perpetrated upon blacks 
during the “Reign of Terror.” In a pluralistic society like America, 
whites, like all other participants, also need the protection of law to 
secure their rights. 
 Between the framework of the two regimes, however, a legal void 
still lingers. African Americans and their communities suffered 
speciªc harms and damages from the “Reign of Terror” distinct from 
those experienced by Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans.304 Civil 
rights laws that merely guard against future wrongs committed against 
any racial group, do not attend to the damage inºicted by the 353 
year lifespan of the “Reign of Terror.”305
IV. Rights but Not Remedies 
 Due to the law’s prominent role in subordinating blacks, this ar-
ticle maintains that African Americans today cannot depend on the 
law alone as the guarantor of their status and well-being.306 Instead, 
                                                                                                                      
although the racial badge of slavery and Jim Crow were afªxed to blacks in unique ways. 
See generally A Reader on Race, Civil Rights and American Law: A Multiracial Ap-
proach (Timothy Davis et al. eds., 2001). 
302 Race based civil rights legislation uniformly prohibits discrimination based on race, 
color, and national origin. Equal Protection, supra note 232, at 267-73. 
303 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978). 
304 The enslavement visited upon successive generations of blacks over the course of 
three centuries followed by their systematic disenfranchisement and subordination as a 
matter of law and practice represents a unique experience among America’s racial and 
ethnic groups. See Feagin, supra note 61, at 205–09. 
305 See supra Part III.C. 
306 Blacks’ status under American law has been a cyclical ºuctuation from hostility to 
facial neutrality. See supra Part III.A–B. Rather than a constant progression in their legal 
status from the beginning of the “Reign of Terror” to the end of the “Reign of Rights,” 
blacks have often had legal freedoms and equality stripped from them at both the state 
and federal level through executive actions, legislation, or judicial decisions. See supra Part 
III.A–B. Just as the ªrst enslaved Africans enjoyed freedoms and protections under law that 
many of their descendants would never experience, generations of “free” blacks had voting 
rights, economic rights, and educational rights under the law that were subsequently 
stripped from them and their children. See supra Part III.A–B. From a historical perspec-
tive, for 344 years of blacks’ 386 year sojourn in America, the law was repeatedly and inten-
tionally used to maintain black subjugation to whites. See supra Part III.A–B. 
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they must focus upon gaining and maintaining power in the educa-
tional, political, and economic spheres of society. By doing so, blacks 
can gain a level of protection for both their well-being and their legal 
status, which the law alone cannot provide.307 To examine this issue 
further, this article explores the work of scholars Kimberle’ Williams 
Crenshaw, Derrick Bell and Ralphe Bunch who analyze the successes 
and failures of civil rights laws in protecting blacks. In different ways, 
each author highlights the historic limitations of the “Reign of Rights” 
and the American legal system more broadly. These contributions 
support the contention presented in this article that the law alone is 
unable to secure blacks’ status and well-being. 
 In one of the foundational articles on critical race theory, Kim-
berle’ Williams Crenshaw examines civil rights history to point out two 
competing views historically present in civil rights laws: the Restrictive 
View and the Expansive View.308 The Restrictive View, often adopted by 
conservatives, characterizes civil rights laws as creating a formal equality 
irrespective of race, without regard to results.309 The Expansive View, in 
                                                                                                                      
In light of the short time period that law has arguably been neutral toward African 
Americans, additional periods of regression and decline in African American legal status 
could still be in America’s future. Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, at 195. The 
purpose of this article is not to predict that law will become hostile towards blacks, but to 
point out how law has and still can be used to restrict blacks’ enjoyment of freedom and 
equality within the society. In this sense, the history of blacks’ legal status under American 
law is also the history of blacks’ social status in American society. The law represented a 
tool by which societal beliefs and fears about race were codiªed and preserved. 
307 This serves as a merging of the DuBois and Washington philosophies in the early 
twentieth century. DuBois advocated the pursuit of civil/political rights for blacks, while 
Washington promoted the development of economic power as a means of securing en-
hanced well-being and legal equality. W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folks 36–50 
(Penguin Classics 1996) (1903). 
308 Crenshaw, supra note 8, at 1341. This article critiques the characterization of the 
civil rights law given by neoconservative Thomas Sowell and the Critical Legal Studies ap-
praisal by Thomas Kushnet. Using both men as representatives of larger critiques of con-
temporary civil rights advocacy, Crenshaw methodically demonstrates the signiªcant short-
comings of both ideological boundaries. Id. at 1334. In brief, according to Crenshaw, 
Sowell maintains that civil rights laws were intended merely to remove the barriers of racial 
injustice to establish equal opportunity, regardless of race, as the new paradigm for Ameri-
can decision-making in politics, economics, and education. Id. at 1338–41. According to 
Crenshaw, Sowell maintains that this is embodied through a system of formal equality that 
disregards race consciousness in decision making. Id. Sowell therefore maintains that race-
based programs are antithetical to civil rights and equal opportunity and should be abol-
ished. Id. Moreover, Sowell argues that the experience of poverty by a black underclass 
results from their individual choices and not their race, so afªrmative action and related 
programs misdirect them to look to a government program to remedy their situation and 
not their own impoverished culture. Id. at 1343–46. 
309 Id. 
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contrast, characterizes civil rights laws as attending to the consequences 
of historic racism by considering the results as well as the process of 
decision-making.310 Crenshaw’s chief critique of the Restrictive View is 
that it neglects the present consequences of past discrimination and the 
line of historic judicial decisions supporting the use of civil rights laws 
to address such consequences.311 She also points out that past discrimi-
nation had adverse consequences that extend into the present and fu-
ture, which were not addressed by anti-discrimination law based on 
equality as a process.312
 In critiquing the Restrictive View, Crenshaw highlights the historic 
tension between the two views, but fails to note the Restrictive View’s 
greater consistency with the racially biased history of the American le-
gal system.313 In short, the Restrictive View’s vision of the civil rights law 
is the most compatible with the narrow and formalistic reading of 
judges who intended to maintain society’s system of racial subordina-
tion of blacks.314 Under this regime, as shown above, the American le-
gal system authorized and frequently dictated the subordination of 
blacks to whites.315 Over the course of three centuries, legal decisions 
such as Plessy v. Ferguson, The Civil Rights Cases, and Dred Scott ostensibly 
used neutral legal principles as the basis for maintaining blacks’ racial 
subordination to a dominant white majority.316 The courts’ ventures 
into the Expansive View, though real, represent the exception more 
than the rule.317 As shown above, the courts, legislatures, and executive 
branches regularly used neutral legal principles as a means of securing 
and preserving the interests of America’s white majority.318 As seen with 
the abysmal failure to integrate America’s schools despite the bold pro-
nouncements of Brown, as well as the courts’ concessions in post-Brown 
cases, the white majority prefers a Restrictive View of civil rights that 
supports what is understood as in its best interests.319 As used today, the 
Restrictive View arguably accomplishes a similar purpose—to protect 
                                                                                                                      
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 1342–43. 
312 Id. at 1345. 
313 See supra Part III.A–B. 
314 See supra Part III.A–B. 
315 See supra Part III.A–B. 
316 See generally 163 U.S. 537 (1896), 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
317 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (representing employment of an Ex-
pansive View of civil rights). 
318 See supra Part III.A–B. 
319 See generally Bell, supra note 6 (discussing this point regarding civil rights law devel-
opments from 1954 forward). 
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the interest of the country’s white majority from losing beneªts to Afri-
can Americans and others.320
 In this regard, Derrick Bell’s assessment of what he calls “Racial 
Realism” provides an important and more accurate assertion that 
equality is beyond the limits of what America’s existing legal system 
can and will provide. Bell explains: 
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even 
those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no 
more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories 
that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that 
maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that 
all history veriªes. We must acknowledge it and move on.321
This article’s examination of the “Reign of Terror” supports Bell’s 
claim that America’s racial history regarding blacks has been a cyclical 
process of advancements and setbacks, depending upon the needs 
and perceptions of the white majority.322 Any conªdence in progress 
as either a historical necessity or predetermined outcome of societal 
enlightenment on race is misplaced. African Americans continue to 
occupy a tenuous precipice between advancement and setback.323
 Similarly, political scientist Ralph Bunche clearly recognized the 
limitations of law and the Constitution on racial matters in the 1930s. 
Bunche felt that black reliance on civil liberties to secure equal status 
                                                                                                                      
320 This could be based on a simple utilitarian calculus or a notion of white entitle-
ment. See Feagin, supra note 61, at 88–93, 99–103. This phenomenon is implicit in modern 
political practices and rhetoric regarding afªrmative action, welfare, reparations, and any 
topics viewed as primarily promoting the interests of African Americans. See id. The actual 
relationship between the issue and African American beneªts is much less relevant than 
the perception. See id. 
321 Bell, supra note 75, at 79. 
322 See supra Part III.A–B. 
323 Although some would maintain that slow and steady progress is made from the 
process of advancement and setback, history shows that the conditions of the particular 
time period examined better predict the experience of African Americans than the pas-
sage of time alone. See supra Part III.A–B; see also Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, 
at 194-95. See generally Bell, supra note 75. As shown above, laws were more oppressive and 
restrictive regarding African Americans from 1819 to 1865 than they had been over the 
preceding two hundred year history—consider the Dred Scott decision of 1856. See supra 
Part III.A–B. In short, African Americans had and still have nothing in American law that 
they can depend on to ensure that the white majority will not again reverse itself and sub-
ject African Americans to oppressive practices worse than or comparable to those of the 
past. See supra Part III.A–B. This article argues that African Americans must develop and 
institutionalize power in a domestic and international context that can help forestall if not 
prevent certain setbacks. 
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was a mistake.324 In this regard, he recognized that the Constitution 
could not “be anything more than the controlling elements of the soci-
ety wish[ed] it to be” and that the courts and legislatures could not 
make it be anything more than “what American public opinion 
wish[ed] it to be.”325 Bunche, like Bell, bases his conclusions on his ex-
periences as an activist and an academic.326 Accordingly, both of these 
men recognized that political and economic dynamics rooted in the 
needs and wishes of the white majority dictated blacks’ opportunities, 
rather than the ideals articulated in judicial cases or constitutional 
amendments.327
 My analysis of Bell, Bunche, and Crenshaw demonstrate that Af-
rican Americans can not “count on the law” alone as the guarantor of 
their freedom, much less as the means to secure reparations for three 
and one half centuries of mistreatment.328 Instead, this article sug-
gests that African Americans use other means to ensure that past 
harms from slavery, segregation, and legal subordination are repaired 
and their communities restored. 
V. Race and Reparations 
 Blacks still retain a valuable, though underutilized, resource to 
provide their communities with the educational, political, and eco-
nomic institutions needed to enable community members to fully enjoy 
                                                                                                                      
324 Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, at 183; see also Greene, supra note 82, at 
1539-40 (providing an insightful consideration of Bunche’s theory in light of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). 
325 Greene, supra note 82, at 1540. 
326 Bell, supra note 75, at 91–92. 
327 This does not suggest that landmark judicial cases, legislation, and constitutional 
amendments have been insigniªcant to African American well-being, but that these legal 
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the Fifteenth Amendment operated as a dead letter law for most African Americans from 
1875 to 1968. See generally Race, Law, and American History, supra note 271. Though 
intended to enfranchise African American men, neither the state nor the federal courts 
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women over a ninety-three year history. Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, at 195. If 
the establishment of laws alone secured the freedoms they intended, then as Malcolm X 
often pointed out, there would have been no need to pass civil rights legislation to secure 
voting rights. See generally Malcolm X, It’s the Ballot or the Bullet, 60 Militant (1964) (pro-
viding context for Malcolm X’s statement). Likewise, if the state and federal governments 
of today lose their political will to protect the rights of African Americans, the various laws 
of the civil rights regime will be of little value. 
328 See supra Part III.A–B. 
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their civil liberties: each other.329 The approach to reparations ad-
vanced in this article calls for a particular conception of race rarely en-
gaged by those focused upon the traditional civil rights struggle: race-
consciousness. This consciousness and its relationship to the civil rights 
advocacy over the past twenty-ªve years are skillfully explored by Gary 
Peller in his article of the same name.330 This article intends to high-
light the importance of a race-conscious approach to remedying the 
harms of slavery and segregation. 
 Peller contends that current liberal conceptions of race result 
from a “tacit consensus” that “the replacement of prejudice and dis-
crimination with reason and neutrality—is the proper way to conceive 
of racial justice . . . .”331 Nationally, the cost of the commitment to reject 
white supremacy, he argues, was “the rejection of race consciousness 
among African Americans.”332 This rejection, Peller explains, grew out 
of the “integrationist perspective” that deªned racism in terms of irra-
tionality growing from ignorance and superstition.333 This ignorance 
results in bias and prejudice that cloud rational judgment based on 
non-racial criteria.334 As a result, rather than biased decision-making 
based on racial groups, integration resulted in decision-making rooted 
in individual identity.335 Peller writes: 
Once neutrality replaced discrimination, equal opportunity 
would lead to integrated institutions; experience in integrated 
institutions would, in turn, replace the ignorance of racism 
with the knowledge that actual contact provides. This deep 
link between racism and ignorance on the one hand, and in-
tegration and knowledge on the other hand, helps explain 
the initial focus of integrationists on public education: Chil-
dren who attended integrated schools would learn the truth 
                                                                                                                      
329 This article’s commendation of self-reliance and self-determination neither rejects 
nor minimizes the contribution that well meaning whites, Latinos, Asians, and Native 
Americans can make to such efforts. Nevertheless, blacks will have to play a primary role in 
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330 See generally Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758. 
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about each others’ unique individuality before they came to 
believe stereotypes rooted in ignorance.336
 These views, Peller notes, grew out of a high level of abstraction 
rooted in a type of universalism that associates particularism with igno-
rance and universalism with truth.337 Through this lens, he points out, 
“racism becomes equivalent to other forms of prejudice and discrimi-
nation based on irrational stereotype. Social domination based on race, 
gender, sexual preference, religion, age, national origin, language, and 
physical disability or appearance can all be categorized as the same 
phenomenon because they all represent bias . . . .”338 This bias, he 
makes clear, represents a deviation from a rational standard rooted in 
neutral principles.339 As a result of the abstraction, the relationships 
between Anglos and other groups, such as African Americans and His-
panics, are all viewed through the lens of discrimination against racial 
minorities in legal and political dialogue.340 This view, that focuses 
upon numeric terms rather than particular historic contexts, represents 
a uniform understanding of “discrimination.”341 From this perspective, 
anyone can be a victim of racism and anyone can practice it because 
racism represents a “deviation from a universal norm of objectivity.”342 
As a result, Peller explains, “power relations” and “historical contexts” 
have no relationship to the integrationist conception of racism.343 In-
stead, racism is understood as “possessing a race-consciousness” that 
sees race as a relevant factor in social relations.344
 Peller contrasts the integrationist perspective with the race-con- 
sciousness framework of black nationalism during the 1960s and 
1970s.345 At the core of the disagreement is the conception of the per-
son. Within liberal ideology the individual seeks independence from 
the constraints of group identity in social relations to attain freedom, 
while under nationalist ideology the basis of social relations ºows out 
                                                                                                                      
336 Peller, supra note 330, at 770. 
337 Id. at 772. 
338 Id. at 773. 
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342 Peller, supra note 330, at 773. 
343 Id. 
344 Id. at 773–74. 
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of a particularist history that provides the basis for social meaning.346 
From the nationalist perspective, “[n]ationhood, understood as a his-
torically created community, assumes that social bonds of identity, 
recognition, and solidarity can be liberating and fulªlling . . . .”347 
Under this view, the liberal notion of whites and blacks as essentially 
“the same” is rejected for the view that whites and blacks are different, 
“in the sense of coming from different communities, neighborhoods, 
churches, families, and histories . . . .”348 This outlook, Peller notes, 
ºows from an understanding that successive generations of blacks and 
whites, experienced “dissimilar conditions of life,” which provided the 
basis for a group identity distinct from the traditional liberal notions 
governing group/individual relations.349 The nationalist argument, 
consequently, challenged the commitment to universality over par-
ticularity and the ostensible “objectivity” and “neutrality” in social re-
lations that allegedly accompanied it.350
 The remainder of this review of race-consciousness focuses on 
the group relations dynamic implicit in the nationalist perspectives 
discussed by Peller. In an examination of school integration, Peller 
illustrates that nationalists sought local control of schools and re-
sources to guide and direct the education of black children, thereby 
rejecting the integrationists’ idea that improved education for black 
children meant educational association with white children and as-
similation into the predominant culture. Black nationalist Stokely 
Carmichael once explained: “The goal is not to take black children 
out of the black community and expose them to white middle-class 
values; the goal is to build and strengthen the black community 
. . . .”351 The integrationist sought the “integration” of blacks into the 
white community as individuals whose racial identity was irrelevant. 
Nationalists, on the other hand, wanted to develop the “black com-
munity” through the transfer of resources and power—integration 
                                                                                                                      
346 Id. at 793–95. 
347 Id. at 794. 
348 Peller, supra note 330, at 792. 
349 Id. at 793. 
350 Id. at 804. Peller points to two principle disagreements the nationalist perspective 
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norms and standards developed under systems of racial exclusion and domination. Con-
cerning false objectivity claims Peller explains, “[a]ccording to nationalists in the 1960s, 
these traditional categories of liberal and enlightenment thought do not constitute an 
aracial or culturally neutral standard that measures social progress in overcoming partial-
ity, parochialism, and bias; rather they are simply elements in the dominant worldview of 
white elites.” Id. at 803. 
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had almost the opposite effect by redirecting resources and people 
away from the community.352 The result of this trend, nationalists 
feared, would be the elimination of the black community. 
 The nationalists’ fears were not realized, but another travesty did 
result. African American communities and institutions lost very impor-
tant resources and support essential to their survival.353 Many of these 
institutions and resources had been developed with a reparative ele-
ment that sought to build educational, economic, and other resources 
denied under the “Reign of Terror.”354 Consequently, the redirection of 
resources and support away from African American communities led to 
the elimination of some and the evisceration of other institutions oper-
ating with a reparative mission. 
 This present reality coincides with the view of the historical sub-
ordination of blacks under the “Reign of Terror” adopted in this arti-
cle. Rather than the “cognitive distortion of stereotype and prejudice” 
identiªed by Peller as the integrationist understanding of racism, the 
examination of law beginning this chapter suggests an analysis rooted 
in the development of laws and policies intended to preserve the 
beneªts derived from black subordination.355 From the laws proscrib-
ing the education of enslaved and “free” blacks, to the “lawful” disen-
franchisement of most blacks throughout the past three centuries, 
white racial domination was a way of preserving the socioeconomic 
beneªts of racism. This article thus challenges the view that the 
American legal system will act contrary to what is perceived by the ma-
jority of whites as in their best interests. More speciªcally, the courts 
are unlikely to require, against the wishes of the white majority, that 
                                                                                                                      
352 Peller explains: 
Hence, rather than providing the material means for improving the housing, 
schools, cultural life, and economy of black neighborhoods, nationalists saw 
mainstream race reform as entailing ‘progress’ only through blacks moving 
into historically white neighborhoods, attending historically white schools, 
participating in white cultural activities, and working in white-owned and 
white-controlled economic enterprises. 
Id. at 797. 
353 Id. at 845–46. 
354 See Waterhouse, supra note 22, for an examination of the reparative nature of his-
toric black institutions. 
355 The Dred Scott opinion, the Fugitive Slave Act, and various laws designed to disen-
franchise blacks reºected decisions intended to preserve material and psychological 
beneªts derived from the subordination of blacks. Feagin, supra note 61, at 24, 205. These 
laws represented group-based decision-making that constrained black life based on group 
membership rather than individual characteristics. See id. 
260 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:207 
today’s society take responsibility for repairing harms that the previ-
ous society deemed in their and their offspring’s best interests. 
 White baby boomers represent the chief living beneªciaries of 
the white domination of the previous centuries.356 These beneªts, 
however, are rendered invisible in the liberal conception of race, so 
that accomplishments are viewed in exclusively individualistic terms 
that disregard superior access to resources and opportunities based 
on racial criteria for that generation and the preceding generations. 
Hence, contemporary power relations are based on neutral principles 
of objectivity that deny racial signiªcance and instead are based on 
individual achievement. Justice Scalia demonstrates this view in his 
opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena in which he wrote: 
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial dis-
crimination should be made whole; but under our Constitu-
tion there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a 
debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus 
upon the individual . . . . To pursue the concept of racial en-
titlement—even for the most admirable and benign of pur-
poses—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the 
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege 
and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one 
race here. It is American.357
In his opinion, Justice Scalia associates race-consciousness under the 
Constitution with the racial subordination associated with historic white 
supremacy.358 This perspective adopted by Justice Scalia promotes a 
revisionist view of history that faults racially-based government action as 
the basis for historic injustice rather than the democratically expressed 
bias of the nation’s racial majority.359 Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s view 
equates race-neutral principles with racial justice—although the poll 
taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses of the Jim Crow South 
show how racially-neutral legal principles can serve to protect racial 
majoritarian bias in the law.360
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 Under this view, slavery and discrimination are characterized as 
acts of individual choice based on race-consciousness rather than a sys-
tematic racial subordination secured through neutral principles of law. 
Contrary to this claim, the legal survey at the beginning of the article 
illustrates that discrimination was regularly a collective decision pro-
vided through “democratic” and Constitutional means.361 These collec-
tive decisions take the form of legislation and judicial reasoning that 
allows and frequently requires black subordination. Consider the laws 
prohibiting black education, employment in certain trades, ownership 
of property, and voting as a few examples.362 Persons treating blacks as 
equals in these instances were subject to punishment by the community 
for breaching the norm that demanded black subordination. In this 
context, it becomes more apparent how racism, deªned as an individ-
ual expression of bias, serves to hide the collective nature of white 
domination and the governmental and institutional structures that 
maintained it. Contemporary American society rejects responsibility for 
the historical decisions of some of its citizens to enslave blacks and oth-
erwise discriminate against them. It has yet, however, to accept that 
slavery and segregation reºected the collective choice of the predomi-
nant white society as expressed through the decisions of democratically 
elected local, state and federal ofªcials.363
 By employing a race conscious view, the necessity that blacks turn 
to themselves to repair the harms of slavery, segregation, and legal 
subordination suffered by their communities becomes more appar-
ent.364 To see reparations manifest, blacks, like the Baudelaire chil-
dren in Lemony Snicket’s tale, will have to look to their own resources 
and abilities to secure the remediation of longstanding harms.365 In 
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cial bias that can be readily expressed through neutral principles as well explicit racial 
designations. See Black Protest Thought, supra note 75, at 196–201. 
361 See supra Part III.A–B. 
362 See supra Part III.A–B. 
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Americans are culpable for the harms associated with slavery and segregation. This article 
distinguishes the culpability for past harms from the responsibility that a person or a 
community has to itself to remedy the damage that others caused. 
365 This suggestion in no way supports the claims of those opposing black reparations 
as unfair to America and its citizens or as counterproductive. Arguments rooted in the 
contemporary generations’ rejection of responsibility for its predecessors’ wrongdoing, 
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making that decision, blacks do not divorce themselves from aid or 
assistance of others or even the use of the legal system, when viable. 
Instead, they recognize their own centrality in determining their own 
future and their ability to prosper despite the series of unfortunate 
events behind them and probably ahead of them. 
Conclusion 
 To meet the goal of reparations to provide black communities with 
the educational, political, and economic resources necessary to enable 
their members to exercise and enjoy their civil liberties, I propose a 
plan of institutional development.366 The development I propose facili-
tates the enjoyment of freedom envisioned by abolitionists Benjamin 
Franklin and Wendell Phillips and embellished by moral philosopher 
Timothy Jackson in his discussion of libertas.367 This approach takes full 
account of the limitations of the legal system in securing community 
remediation, in accord with the political sensibilities of Ralph Bunche 
and the “racial realism” of Derrick Bell. Finally, the solutions proposed 
herein embrace the race-consciousness counseled by Gary Peller as a 
vital component of an institutional approach to reparations. 
 Community well-being and the quality of life of community mem-
bers have been shown to correlate with the strength of community in-
stitutions.368 In the most depressed and blighted communities in Amer-
ica, the educational, political, and economic institutions range from 
weak to non-existent.369 To repair the longstanding harms resulting 
from the “Reign of Terror,” I advance the creation of new and the ref-
ormation of existing black educational, political, and economic institu-
tions. My proposal begins with the creation of three independent trust 
funds: the Educational Fund, the Political Fund, and the Economic 
Fund. Each of these funds will operate in accordance with a governing 
                                                                                                                      
while it enjoys the beneªts of those same actions appear self-serving and are unpersuasive. 
Likewise, the rejection of black reparations claims based on their potential to harm con-
temporary race relations seem speculative and an insufªcient basis to neglect the redress 
of slavery and segregation based harms. 
366 See supra Part I. 
367 See supra Part I. 
368 James Peach, Regional Income Inequality Revisited: Lessons from the 100 Lowest-Income 
Counties in the United States, in Inequality: Radical Institutionalist Views on Race, 
Gender, Class, and Nation 237, 238, 245–47 (William M. Dugger ed., 1996). See gener-
ally William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban 
Poor (1997) for an in depth examination of the relationship between community eco-
nomic institutions and the well-being of residents. 
369 Peach, supra note 368, at 245–47. 
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charter to guide it in funding organizations and institutions committed 
to building black communities.370
 Educational reparations would focus on improving the education 
provided to the youth of black communities. To accomplish this, I sug-
gest that the Educational Fund provide grants to aid in the establish-
ment of charter schools in black communities. These schools would be 
open to all children, but their curricula would be geared toward meet-
ing the educational needs of black children. Similar to businesses 
funded by the Economic Trust, schools gaining support would show 
their commitment to promoting the values adopted by the Education 
Trust. Trust-sponsored schools would retain their freedom to design 
their charters in different ways as long as the values of the Education 
Trust are included.371 School types should vary widely to include di-
verse educational foci such as math and science, performing arts, in-
ternational language and culture, and public service among others. 
Along with seeding the creation of new charter schools, the Educa-
tional Fund would support the creation and expansion of private acad-
emies open to all students but dedicated to meeting the educational 
needs of black youth. My proposal also includes substantial funding for 
targeted programming by historically black colleges and universities. 
These grants would cover scholarships and fellowships for students, en-
dowed chairs for faculty, as well as reparations related research. The 
Educational Fund would also make scholarships and fellowships avail-
able to undergraduate, graduate, and professional students at majority 
institutions who commit to black institutional service. 
 The focus of the Political Fund would be the creation and devel-
opment of black political institutions. This trust would have the respon-
sibility for funding institutions and organizations that enhance the po-
litical awareness of black community members and increase their 
political inºuence. While these organizations would demonstrate a 
commitment to the communal and other values proffered by the Po-
litical Fund, they could use a variety of means and approaches tailored 
to their primary constituency. Black political institutions would likely 
begin with a local and regional focus by organizing the black electorate 
in the southern states and a selection of large cities with substantial 
                                                                                                                      
370 The values anchoring the charters of the three trusts emanate from the African 
American holiday of Kwanzaa. Unity, Purpose, Collective Work and Responsibility, Coop-
erative Economics, Faith, Creativity, and Self Determination serve as communal values to 
guide trust operations. 
371 Along with the communal values identiªed above excellence, other values would 
become necessary parts of sponsored schools charters. 
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black populations.372 Sponsored institutions would develop constituent 
support by designing local and regional goals and objectives in light of 
the political ideologies of black communities.373 One organization 
might be a non-partisan issue oriented membership organization. This 
organization would operate through local chapters and a national pol-
icy ofªce. It will conduct grass roots organizing to inform residents 
about the political process and then support their involvement around 
local and regional issues. Young adult involvement, education, and or-
ganizing should be a fundamental strategy of this organization. By 
training and involving youth, the organization furthers two critical ob-
jectives: 1) strengthening its volunteer workforce, and 2) building a 
foundation for future political organizing. 
 My proposal also includes the creation of a Bethune Washington 
Institute to support the scholarship mandate of the reparations char-
ter. The Institute would operate like the Brookings Institute as a non-
partisan organization committed to supporting the research of a wide 
range of scholars related to questions of reparations. Scholars with 
full-time commitments to other institutions would serve as afªliates 
working along with Institute fellows in conducting research, publish-
ing ªndings and making policy recommendations based on that re-
search. Beyond governmental policy, Institute scholarship would ad-
dress the political, educational, economic, and legal policies of private 
groups and individuals. Through the work of the Institute, black edu-
cational, political, and economic institutions committed to repara-
tions would receive meaningful insights into fulªlling their objectives. 
Furthermore, fellows can address relevant questions regarding cul-
tural, medical, and familial reparations through research, publication 
and the use of developed networks of dissemination. 
 In the economic realm, I propose that the trust support the devel-
opment of new and existing black businesses that demonstrate a com-
mitment to the goal of reparations. Enhancing the quality and number 
of black businesses serves two purposes: providing jobs and increasing 
the availability of quality goods and services to community members. 
Speciªc businesses ideas could include such as a national newspaper 
and a major production studio for the creation of television and cin-
                                                                                                                      
372 Cities would include Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, Houston, and Los 
Angeles. 
373 These ideologies cover a spectrum that includes disillusioned liberals, nationalists, 
feminists/womanists, Marxists/egalitarians, and conservatives. See generally Michael C. 
Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political 
Ideologies (2001). 
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ema productions, collaborative business ventures with Caribbean and 
African nations, and development programs focused on training black 
youth for future business ownership and management. 
 These programs would compose a communal approach to repara-
tions rooted in the formation and reformation of black institutions. 
This approach differs from the prevailing notions of reparations fo-
cused on legal theory or congressional enactment, in its independence 
from governmental action and its emphasis on institutional develop-
ment. Rather than a court-ordered remedy or a legislative design, my 
proposal begins and ends with black communal action.374 In this sense 
blacks, like the Baudelaire orphans, will use their own abilities to secure 
their futures in the world. In the event that those who owe them duties 
and responsibilities meet their obligations, they can accept their acts 
with pleasure as a complement to their own efforts. By focusing on 
their own abilities and initiative, however, blacks need not risk the dis-
appointment and damage that might result from the ongoing series of 
unfortunate legal events. 
                                                                                                                      
374 It is worth noting that this approach does not foreclose monetary awards obtained 
from legal action by the judiciary or legislative branches of the American government. My 
proposal, however, allows the integration of legally based awards into the funding scheme 
for the three reparations trust funds contemplated within my proposal, though it is not 
dependent upon such awards. See Waterhouse, supra note 22 for a full elaboration of my 
proposal, including the institutional mechanisms, motivations, and funding methodology. 
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